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California Supreme Court Survey
April 1989- June 1989
The California Supreme Court Survey is a synopsis of decisions by the
Supreme Court of California. The survey's purpose is to supply the reader
with information and a basic understanding of the issues addressed by the
court, as well as to provide a starting point for research of the topical areas
involved. Toward this end, each summary discusses one recent case before the
court, while analyzing it according to the importance of the holding and the
extent to which the court expands or modifies existing law. The survey treats
death penalty decisions cumulatively every six months in a single article de-
voted to the recurrent issues within each case. Attorney discipline decisions
are omitted from the survey.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Adult entertainment zoning ordinances should be
applied only to movie theaters at which sexually
explicit films "constitute a substantial portion of the
films shown." Under no circumstances can a single
showing of an adult film make a theater subject to
enforcement: People v. Superior Court (Lucero) ........ 526
II. CONTRACT LAW
Breach of a contract warranty is a violation of
sections 7107 and 7113 of the Business and
Professions Code and may subject a licensed
contractor to discipline: Viking Pools, Inc. v.
M aloney ................................................ 529
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. A defendant opposing joinder of offenses under
section 954 of the Penal Code has the burden of
clearly demonstrating potential prejudice, even if the
evidence for the different offenses would not be
cross-admissible in separate trials: Frank v. Superior
C ourt .................................................. 531
B. Presentence custody credits against a prison sentence
may be granted if the presentence custody was
exclusively attributable to the conduct for which the
petitioner ultimately was convicted: In re Joyner. ... 534
IV. DEATH PENALTY LAW-SURVEY III
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing
the death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case
approach, this section focuses on the key issues
under review by the court and identifies trends and
shifts in the court's rationale ........................ 537
V. INSURANCE LAW
The Proposition 103 insurance initiative is facially
constitutional in principal part: Insurance Code
sections 1861.01(b), which temporarily denied rate
increases to all insurers not facing insolvency, and
1861.10(c), which named a private corporation to
protect policyholders' interests, were declared
unconstitutional but severable from the remainder
of the initiative: Calfarm Insurance Company v.
Deukm ejian ............................................ 561
VI. TORT LAW
A. In a defamation action, no statutory or common law
privilege extends beyond the constitutional
requirements protecting the media in reporting on
matters of "public interest"; therefore, a private
figure need prove only negligence on behalf of a
media defendant to prevail in a libel or slander
action: Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co ................ 575
B. Wihen a psychotherapist molests a minor child
during the course of individual counseling of mother
and child for intra-family problems, the mother has
a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
due to the psychotherapist's breach of the duty of
care to the mother and child as patients: Marlene F.
v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc ............. 584
C. The holding in Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation
that a party may receive only contract damages for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in employment contracts shall be applied
retroactively: Newman v. Emerson Radio Corporation.. 586
D. To recover as a bystander under a theory of
emotional distress, the plaintiff must suffer severe
emotional distress as a result of actual presence and
awareness at an event causing injury to a victim
closely related to the plaintiff: Thing v. La Chusa..... 588
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VII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
In the absence of extreme or outrageous conduct, the
exclusive remedy against the independent claims
administrator of a self-insured employer for the
delay or refusal to pay compensation benefits is a
claim through the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board: Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Superior Court ..... 602
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Adult entertainment zoning ordinances should be applied
only to movie theaters at which sexually explicit films
"constitute a substantial portion of the films shown."
Under no circumstances can a single showing of an adult
film make a theater subject to enforcement: People v.
Superior Court (Lucero).
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Superior Court (Lucero),1 the California Supreme
Court considered whether a Long Beach movie theater was an "adult
entertainment business" as defined in the city's "Anti-Skid Row"
zoning ordinance.2 The owners of the movie theater were charged
with numerous misdemeanor counts under the ordinance, but they
demurred on the grounds that each of the complaints alleged only a
single showing of an adult film, and as such, the theater was not an
"adult entertainment theater."3
The court of appeal agreed that a theater could not be deemed an
"adult entertainment theater" based on a "single-use" standard as
contended by the People.4 The supreme court affirmed, but dis-
agreed with the appellate court's holding that a "preponderance" of
the movies shown by a theater must be sexually explicit before such
an ordinance can be applied. Instead, the supreme court enunciated
1. 49 Cal. 3d 14, 774 P.2d 769, 259 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1989). Chief Justice Lucas wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Eagleson, and Kaufman concurred.
Justices Mosk and Kennard wrote separate opinions, each concurring and dissenting.
2. Id. at 18, 774 P.2d at 770, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 741. The ordinance prohibited adult
entertainment businesses from locating within 500 feet of any residential zone, within
1,000 feet of any other adult entertainment business, or within 1,000 feet of any school,
park, playground, public building, church, religious organization, or establishment
likely to be used by minors. LONG BEACH, CA., MUN. CODE ch. 21.51. The ordinance is
reprinted in full in the appendix to the case. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 38, 774 P.2d at 777-
79, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 748-50.
3. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 19, 774 P.2d at 771, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 742. After the munic-
ipal court overruled the demurrers, the superior court granted a peremptory writ of
mandate with leave to amend. The People declined to amend and instead sought a
writ of mandate from the court of appeal compelling the superior court to vacate its
judgment. Id.
4. Id. at 20, 774 P.2d at 771-72, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 742-43. The court of appeal relied
on Pringle v. City of Covina, 115 Cal. App. 3d 151, 171 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1981), which held
that a "preponderance" or "more often than not" standard should be applied in deter-
mining whether a movie theater will be regulated under an adult entertainment zon-
ing statute. Id. at 162, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 257. The supreme court disapproved Pringle to
the extent that it conflicts with the standard established in this case. Lucero, 49 Cal.
3d at 28, 774 P.2d at 777, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 748. It also disapproved two other appellate
court decisions that interpreted Pringle as establishing a preponderance standard. Id.
at 28 n.10, 774 P.2d at 777 n.10, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 748 n.10 (citing Strand Property Corp.
v. Municipal Court, 148 Cal. App. 3d 882, 200 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1983); Kuhns v. Board of
Supervisors, 128 Cal. App. 3d 369, 181 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1982)).
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the proper standard: whether X-rated movies 5 "constitute a substan-
tial portion of the films shown or account for a substantial part of the
revenues." 6 The court additionally noted that while the preponder-
ance standard is "not constitutionally compelled," a municipality is
free to specify that higher standard in its ordinance. 7
II. TREATMENT OF THE CASE
Municipal zoning ordinances restricting adult entertainment thea-
ters were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Young v.
American Mini Theaters, Inc.8 The Long Beach law was modeled af-
ter the two Detroit ordinances examined in Young.9 The California
Supreme Court in this case, relying on Young and its progeny,10 con-
cluded that the city's substantial governmental interest in regulating
5. LONG BEACH,.CA., MUN. CODE ch. 21.51, § 21.51.020(A). The ordinance defined
an adult motion picture theater as one that shows material "depicting, describing or
relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas." Id. Definitions of
"specified sexual activities," and "specified anatomical areas" are contained in the ordi-
nance. Id. § 21.51.020(B), (C).
6. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 19, 774 P.2d at 770-71, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 741-42. The short-
hand term used by the court for referring to this standard is "regular and substantial
course of conduct." Id. at 19, 774 P.2d at 771, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 742. Thus, it is unconsti-
tutional to apply an adult entertainment zoning ordinance to a theater for a "single
showing" of an X-rated movie. Id. at 28, 774 P.2d at 777, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
7. Id. at 19, 774 P.2d at 770, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
8. 427 U.S. 50, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). The ordinances were upheld as
permissible licensing regulations or locational restrictions. Id. at 62-63; see 7 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 319 (9th ed. 1988). See
generally 50 AM. JUR. 2D Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity § 26 (1970 & Supp. 1989);
66 CAL. JUR. 3D Zoning and Other Land Controls, §§ 76-77 (1981 & Supp. 1989); Day,
The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 491 (1988); Comment,
Zoning and the First Amendment: A Municipality's Power to Control Adult Use Estab-
lishments, 55 UMKC L. REV. 263 (1987); Note, Zoning and the First Amendment
Rights of Adult Entertainment, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 695 (1988); Recent Development,
Trends in First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech, 41 VAND. L. REV. 173
(1988).
9. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 18, 774 P.2d at 770, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 741. In Walnut
Properties v. City Council of the City of Long Beach, 100 Cal. App. 2d 1018, 161 Cal.
Rptr. 411 (1980), the court of appeal upheld the constitutionality of the Long Beach
ordinance based upon the holding in Young. See Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 22, 774 P.2d at
773, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
10. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Renton em-
phasized that municipalities have a "substantial governmental interest" in regulating
the "secondary effects" of adult entertainment. Id. at 50-52. However, the government
may not use this rationale as a pretext for limiting protected expression on the basis of
content. Thus, "reasonable alternative avenues of communication" must be available.
Id. at 53-54. In the instant case, the California Supreme Court viewed both Young and
Renton as requiring "that an ordinance be content-neutral and narrowly tailored to
minimize only the adverse secondary effects related to adult entertainment establish-
ments." Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 27, 774 P.2d at 776, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
adult theaters would not be served by applying a single-use stan-
dard."1 Instead, the court viewed "substantiality" in the number of
the films shown or revenue received as the constitutional minimum,
rejecting the single-use standard as too restrictive on the one hand,
and the "preponderance" requirement 12 as too relaxed on the
other.13
Justice Mosk concurred that the single-use standard was unconsti-
tutional, but dissented on the basis that the majority was effectively
legislating the standard imposed. 14 Because earlier cases had not es-
tablished a rigid standard, he characterized the majority's creation of
a new standard as unnecessary.15 Justice Kennard also agreed that
the single-use standard was unconstitutional,16 and she emphasized
that the City of Long Beach, rather than the court, should determine
its new standards. 17 Furthermore, both Justices Mosk and Kennard
criticized the majority's "regular and substantial course of conduct"
standard as being vague.'8
11. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 27-28, 774 P.2d at 776-77, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 747-48.
12. See supra note 4.
13. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 26, 774 P.2d at 776, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 746 (citing Tollis, Inc.
v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1987) (a single-use standard
is not narrowly tailored to further the substantial governmental interest of limiting
the secondary effects of adult entertainment)). Under the supreme court's reasoning,
a lower standard is implicitly compelled because the deleterious effects of adult en-
tertainment outlets arise even if 49%, as opposed to 51%, of a theater's fare is sexually
explicit. Id. at 26 n.8, 774 P.2d at 776 n.8, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 747 n.8.
14. Id. at 28-34, 774 P.2d at 779-82, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Mosk cited Christy v. City of Ann Arbor, 824 F.2d 489 (6th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1059 (1988), for the proposition that municipalities
must state the findings on which their ordinances are based. He then argued that the
supreme court had violated this rule by creating a new standard in the absence of find-
ings or a record from the court below. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 31-32, 774 P.2d at 781, 259
Cal. Rptr. at 752 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
15. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 32-33, 774 P.2d at 781-82, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 752-53 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting). Earlier cases recognized the right of a municipality to
adopt a standard other than the preponderance test. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (citing Strand Property Corp. v. Municipal Court, 148 Cal. App. 3d 882, 200
Cal. Rptr. 47 (1983); Kuhns v. Board of Supervisors, 128 Cal. App. 3d 369, 181 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1982)). However, the majority merely held that in the absence of clear legislative
intent, the preponderance standard is not constitutionally compelled. The majority ac-
knowledged that municipalities may explicitly adopt the preponderance standard or
some other formula if they so choose. Id. at 19, 774 P.2d at 770, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 741;
see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
16. Lucero, 49 Cal. 3d at 35, 774 P.2d at 783, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 754 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
17. Id. at 35-37, 774 P.2d at 783-85, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 754-56 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Kennard emphasized that the City of Long Beach was free to
specify a standard other than "preponderance," but that it had failed to do so. She
noted that the city's attorney specifically stated that the city was interested only in le-
gitimizing the single-use standard. Id. at 35, 774 P.2d at 783-84, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 754-55
(Kennard., J., concurring and dissenting).
18. Id. at 33, 774 P.2d at 782, 259 Cal. Rptr. at,753 (Mosk, J., concurring and dis-
senting); id. at 36-37, 774 P.2d at 784, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 755 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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III. CONCLUSION
The City of Long Beach undoubtedly sought the single-use stan-
dard to simplify and expedite its enforcement actions. Under that
test, a newly-opened adult theater could be cited for violating the
"Anti-Skid Row" ordinance immediately after showing its first X-
rated film. Because Lucero constitutionally abrogates the single-use
standard, the city must now document that the showing of adult
films is a "regular and substantial course of conduct." This standard
is less clear cut than the "preponderance" standard, yet a municipal-
ity likely will have little difficulty meeting this burden in most cases
because theaters that show sexually explicit films tend to do so
exclusively.
In the event that a theater can reasonably argue its adult fare is a
"less than substantial" part of its business, the municipality may have
a chance to prove the X-rated showings fall within the Lucero stan-
dard. For example, a theater that shows X-rated films only at mid-
night every Friday and Saturday night and more conventional movies
at all other times probably could not be classified as an adult theater
under the preponderance test. However, a municipality might be
able to argue that these weekend showings fall within Lucero's "reg-
ular and substantial course of conduct" standard by focusing on their
regularity or profitability. Furthermore, a municipality that fears the
new standard is vague or unworkable is not prevented from adopting
the preponderance standard19 or from employing another test that is
narrowly tailored to restrict the negative impact of adult
entertainment. 20
PAUL J. MCCUE
II. CONTRACT LAW
Breach of a contract warranty is a violation of sections
7107 and 7113 of the Business and Professions Code and
may subject a licensed contractor to discipline: Viking
Pools, Inc. v. Maloney.
In Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney,' the California Supreme Court
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 10.
1. 48 Cal. 3d 602, 770 P.2d 732, 257 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1989), Justice Broussard wrote
the unanimous decision of the court, with Arleigh M. Woods, Presiding Justice, Court
of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, sitting by designation.
announced that contractual obligations, not mere physical completion
of a construction project or operation, will define the scope of poten-
tial discipline under the Contractor's State License Law.2 The court
interpreted the statutory phrase "construction project or operation,"
which is referenced in both sections 71073 and 71134 of the Business
and Professions Code, to include an express written warranty,
thereby subjecting Viking Pools to possible discipline5 for its failure
to honor a contractual warranty.6
The court set forth three reasons for its broad construction of the
statutory phrase: (1) the policy behind the statutory design makes it
reasonable to shelter the public from dishonest or incompetent con-
tractors;7 (2) court of appeal cases examining the phrase have found
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7000-7161 (Deering 1984).
3. Id. § 7107. The section provides: "Abandonment without legal excuse of any
construction project or operation engaged in or undertaken by the licensee as a con-
tractor constitutes a cause for disciplinary action." Id. (emphasis added).
4. Id. § 7113. The section states: "Failure in a material respect on the part of a
licensee to complete any construction project or operation for the price stated in the
contract for such construction project or operation or in any modification of such con-
tract constitutes a cause for disciplinary action." Id. (emphasis added).
5. See id. § 7095. Section 7095 delineates possible disciplinary measures:
The decision may:
(a) Provide for the immediate complete suspension by the licensee of all op-
erations as a contractor during the period fixed by the decision. *
(b) Permit the licensee to complete any or all contracts shown by competent
evidence taken at the hearing to be then uncompleted.
(c) Impose upon the licensee compliance with such specific conditions as
may be just in connection with his operations as a contractor disclosed at the
hearing and may further provide that until such conditions are complied with
no application for restoration of the suspended or revoked license shall be ac-
cepted by the registrar.
Id.
6. Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney, 48 Cal. 3d 602, 604, 770 P.2d 732, 733, 257 Cal.
Rptr. 320, 321 (1989). The warranty stated in pertinent part: "Provided VIKING has in-
stalled the pool, VIKING warrants to repair or replace defective material or installation
thereof for a period of 10 years from the date hereof .... " Id. Viking Pools breached
this written contract by refusing to repair a defective swimming pool it had supplied
and installed. Viking argued that its failure to honor the warranty fell outside the
scope of sections 7107 and 7113 because it had completed the installation of the swim-
ming pool. Id. at 605-06, 770 P.2d at 733-34, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22. The court con-
cluded, however, that the breach of warranty was an abandonment under section 7107
and a material failure under section 7113, thereby subjecting Viking Pools to possible
disciplinary action. Id. at 609, 770 P.2d at 736, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 324; see supra notes 2-4.
See generally 11 CAL. JUR. 3D Building and Construction Contracts § 28 (1974) (dis-
cussing abandonment and other grounds for disciplining a contractor).
7. Viking Pools, 48 Cal. 3d at 607-08, 770 P.2d at 734-35, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 322. The
court of appeal viewed the statute as penal and therefore gave it a narrow interpreta-
tion. The supreme court held that it was error to adopt such a narrow view because
the statute's aim is to protect the public, not to punish contractors. Id. A statute that
is enacted not to punish, but to serve another legitimate purpose, is nonpenal in na-
ture. See id. at 607 n.4, 770 P.2d at 735 n.4, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 323 n.4 (explaining that
the statute's nonpenal nature allows a broader interpretation than the one applied by
the court of appeal).
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its scope to be determined by the contract;8 and (3) evidence of the
legislature's intent to interpret the phrase broadly exists, as illus-
trated by the 1980 amendment to section 7091 which extended the
time to file an accusation in cases involving an alleged breach of an
express written warranty.9
By defining the phrase "construction project or operation" under
the terms of the contract, the court furthered a policy of protecting
consumers as well as the business of contracting.10 This statutory in-
terpretation appears reasonable since the discipline imposed by the
Contractors' State License Law is nonpenal."1
BARRY J. REAGAN
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. A defendant opposing joinder of offenses under section
954 of the Penal Code has the burden of clearly
demonstrating potential prejudice, even if the evidence
for the different offenses would not be cross-admissible in
separate trials: Frank v. Superior Court.
In Frank v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court rein-
8. The court utilized two cases in its analysis: Bailey-Sperber, Inc. v. Pensanti, 64
Cal. App. 3d 725, 134 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1977), and Mickelson Concrete Co. v. Contractors'
State License Bd., 95 Cal. App. 3d 631, 157 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1979). In Bailey-Sperber, the
court held that a complaint alleging nonperformance of contractual obligations because
the subcontractor had died was sufficient to assert a cause of action under sections
7107 and 7113. Bailey-Sperber, 64 Cal. App. 3d at 729, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 742. In Mickel-
son Concrete, the contractor failed to remedy adequately a concrete slab he had
poured. The court found a violation of section 7113 because the contractor had failed
to materially complete the project. Mickelson Concrete, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 635, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 98. Based upon these two cases, the supreme court stated that the lower
courts understood the contract as defining the scope of "construction project or opera-
tion." Viking Pools, 48 Cal. 3d at 608, 770 P.2d at 735, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
9. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7091 (Deering 1984). Section 7091 grants three
years to file an accusation against a contractor. The 1980 amendment regards accusa-
tions concerning a breach of an express written warranty differently. In addition to
the normal three years, the statutory period is extended for the duration of the partic-
ular warranty at issue. Thus, the court surmised that "the [1legislature believed that it
had already included a breach of an express, written warranty as a ground for disci-
pline of contractors in sections 7107 and 7113." Viking Pools, 48 Cal. 3d at 609, 770
P.2d at 736, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
10. Viking Pools, 48 Cal. 3d at 608, 770 P.2d at 735, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
11. See supra note 7. But see 51 AM. JUR. 2D Licenses and Permits § 58 (1970) (dis-
cussion of cases regarding disciplinary statutes as penal and applying a narrow inter-
pretation thereto).
1. 48 Cal. 3d 632, 770 P.2d 1119, 257 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1989). Dr. Kenneth Frank was
charged with two rapes occurring approximately four months apart. In unrelated inci-
forced a line of cases giving trial courts broad power to join separate
offenses2 which meet the statutory requirements of section 954 of the
Penal Code.3 The court declared that a defendant moving to sever
counts must carry the burden of demonstrating potential prejudice,4
and further emphasized that cross-admissibility of evidence is only
one of several factors for consideration.5 Because the defendant
failed to meet this burden, the court found no abuse of discretion in
the trial court's denial of the severance motion.6
In Frank, the supreme court acknowledged a "statutory prefer-
ence ' 7 for joinder of offenses under section 954 which could be over-
come only by a "clear showing of potential prejudice" by the
defendant.8 While the requirements of such a showing cannot be
precisely defined, the court restated the guidelines it first applied in
dents, each victim claimed she was drugged and raped by the defendant. The defend-
ant, however, stated that each woman voluntarily engaged in sex with him. At trial,
the defendant moved for separate proceedings on the two counts, arguing that the evi-
dence of the offenses was not cross-admissible and, therefore, a joint trial would be
prejudicial. The motion was denied. After a series of petitions, writs, and reviews, the
California Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
2. Joint trial of separate counts involving different victims or offenses is not un-
common. See, e.g., People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 760 P.2d 996, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467
(1988) (two murders); People v. Keenan, 46 Cal. 3d 478, 758 P.2d 1081, 250 Cal. Rptr.
550 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1656 (1989) (codefendants charged with murder);
People v. Odle, 45 Cal. 3d 386, 754 P.2d 184, 247 Cal. Rptr. 137, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
275 (1988) (two murders); People v. Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d 589, 749 P.2d 854, 244 Cal. Rptr.
200, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 186 (1988) (two murders); People v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144,
711 P.2d 480, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985) (kidnapping, robberies, forcible sex crimes, and
murder involving several victims); Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 441, 683 P.2d
699, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1984) (multiple murders and attempted murders). See gener-
ally California Supreme Court Survey-February 1988-April 1988, 16 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 117, 150 (1988) (discussing Ruiz); California Supreme Court Survey-December
1985-February 1986, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1101, 1127 (1986) (discussing Balderas).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 954 (West Supp. 1989). This section allows joinder of
counts under various conditions, including charged offenses of the same class. It also
gives the trial court discretion to order joined counts to be separated "in the interests
of justice." Id. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indictments & Informations § 221 (1968
& Supp. 1989); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2883 (rev. ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989); 4 B.
WITKIN & N. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 2087 (2d ed. 1989); Van Dam,
Criminal Procedure in a Nutshell: Part 11 Criminal Defense Motions, 12 W. ST. L.
REV. 647, 758 (1985); Annotation, Consolidated Trial Upon Several Indictments or In-
formation Against Same Accused, Over His Objection, 59 A.L.R. 2D 841 (Later Case
Service 1984 & Supp. 1989).
4. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 636, 770 P.2d at 1120-21, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52. This bur-
den was similarly assigned in several earlier cases. See, e.g., Ruiz, 44 Cal. 3d at 605, 749
P.2d at 860-61, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 206; Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d at 171, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 196,
711 P.2d at 492; Williams, 36 Cal. 3d at 452, 683 P.2d at 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
5. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 641, 770 P.2d at 1124, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
6. Id. Justice Panelli authored the majority opinion joined by all except Justice
Broussard, who wrote separately in dissent. Justice Kaufman also wrote a separate
concurrence in response to the dissent.
7. Id. at 640, 770 P.2d at 1123, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
8. Id. at 638, 770 P.2d at 1122, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 553; see also Williams, 36 Cal. 3d
at 447, 683 P.2d at 702, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
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Williams v. Superior Court:9 (1) whether the evidence of the of-
fenses would be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) whether one
of the offenses would be highly inflammatory to the jury; (3)
whether a relatively weak case has been linked to a strong one, or to
other weak cases, causing the evidence of one to "spill over" onto the
others; and (4) whether any of the offenses are capital crimes.'0
These factors then must be balanced against the benefits of financial
and judicial economy which accompany joinder."1 The court stressed
that cross-admissibility is not dispositive; all four Williams factors
must be considered. The court also criticized the defendant's reliance
on People v. Smallwood,12 which suggested the prejudice burden re-
mains on the prosecution in the absence of cross-admissibility.13
Although the prosecution does carry that burden if seeking to intro-
duce evidence of uncharged crimes,14 the defendant has the burden
of showing prejudice throughout a motion to sever charged
offenses.15
The supreme court never decided the cross-admissibility of the evi-
dence in Frank.16 Based on the court's application of the balancing
9. 36 Cal. 3d 441, 452, 683 P.2d 699, 706, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707 (1984).
10. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 639, 770 P.2d at 1122, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 553; see also People
v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 173, 197-98, 711 P.2d 480, 494, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 198 (1985).
11. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 639, 770 P.2d at 1122-23, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 553-54; see also
People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 939-40, 760 P.2d 996, 1108, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 479 (1988)
(joinder eliminates redundant trials and hastens final judgments); People v. Matson, 13
Cal. 3d 35, 41, 528 P.2d 752, 756, 117 Cal. Rptr. 664, 668 (1974) (joinder conserves eco-
nomic resources and minimizes "harassment" of charged parties).
12. 42 Cal. 3d 415, 722 P.2d 197, 228 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1986). See generally California
Supreme Court Survey--June 1986-August 1986, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 453, 492 (1987)
(discussing Smallwood).
13. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 636, 770 P.2d at 1120, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 551; see also Bean,
46 Cal. 3d at 939 n.8, 760 P.2d at 1108 n.8, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 479 n.8 (describing
Smallwood as "misleading").
14. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 639-40, 770 P.2d at 1123, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 554. The court
agreed that the prosecution properly carries the prejudice burden for evidence of un-
charged crimes because such evidence is usually not admissible. See People v. Ander-
son, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 1136, 742 P.2d 1306, 1324, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 603 (1987) (generally
excluding evidence of uncharged crimes); People v. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 303, 317, 611
P.2d 883, 889-90, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 295-96 (1980) (discussing the dangers of admitting
evidence of uncharged crimes at trial).
15. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 639-40, 770 P.2d at 1123, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 554; see also cases
cited supra note 4.
16. However, cross-admissibility was addressed in Justice Broussard's dissent and
Justice Kaufman's concurrence. The dissent argued that evidence of other sex crimes
is prejudicial and should be excluded under People v. Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d 77, 679 P.2d 1,
201 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1984), despite the majority's assertion that Tassell was inapposite
because it dealt with evidence of uncharged crimes rather than the severance of joined
counts. Justice Broussard also gave great weight to the cross-admissibility factor of the
test, the defendant failed to show potential prejudice even assuming
the evidence was not cross-admissible, and the case was remanded for
consolidated trial of the charges.17
Because the court upheld joinder without any consideration of
cross-admissibility, that factor may now be a secondary element of
the Williams guidelines. This adjustment of the balancing test per-
haps reflects the court's concern about congested criminal court cal-
endars. In a cost-benefit analysis weighing defendants' rights against
the expense of multiple trials, the court apparently has tipped the
scales in favor of judicial economy unless a clear danger of prejudice
can be shown. This places an additional burden on judges and de-
fense lawyers to avoid jury confusion about evidence in multiple of-
fense cases which previously would have been severed. In light of
the court's strong language requiring an affirmative demonstration of
potential prejudice, it is possible that the three other Williams guide-
lines also will be reevaluated to allow for more joint trials.
ROBERT J. MILLS
B. Presentence custody credits against a prison sentence may
be granted if the presentence custody was exclusively
attributable to the conduct for which the petitioner
ultimately was convicted: In re Joyner.
In the case of In re Joyner,' the California Supreme Court resolved
a conflict between the courts of appeal regarding credits for
Williams test. He concluded that joinder would be prejudicial and, consequently, that
the trial should be severed. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 643, 770 P.2d at 1125, 257 Cal. Rptr. at
556 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
In response, Justice Kaufman's concurrence vigorously asserted that the evidence
would be cross-admissible because it addressed the issue of the defendant's intent. Id.
at 641-43, 770 P.2d at 1124-25, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56 (Kaufman, J., concurring) (citing
Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 314-15, 611 P.2d at 888, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 294; People v. May-
berry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 155-56, 542 P.2d 1337, 1345-46, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 753-54 (1975)).
See generally Annotation, Admissibility, in Rape Case, of Evidence that Accused Raped
or Attempted to Rape Person Other than Prosecutrix, 2 A.L.R. 4TH 330, 343 (1980 &
Supp. 1988).
17. Frank, 48 Cal. 3d at 641, 770 P.2d at 1124, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
1. 48 Cal. 3d 487, 769 P.2d 967, 256 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1989). Authorities for the State
of California issued arrest warrants in January of 1983 charging the petitioner with
grand theft and robbery. Several months later, the petitioner was arrested in Florida
for two offenses unrelated to the California crimes. Upon request by the California
police, the Florida authorities placed a hold on the petitioner to prevent hig release
pending the resolution of the California offenses. The petitioner failed to post bond
and was held in custody by Florida police until the date of his trial. Approximately six
months after his arrest, the petitioner was convicted of the Florida offenses and sen-
tenced to three years in a state prison. The three-year prison term was reduced by the
number of days representing his presentence custody. The petitioner was then extra-
dited to California, where he was convicted of the California offenses and sentenced to
a four-year prison term to run concurrently with the three-year Florida prison term.
The trial court denied the presentence custody credit requested by the petitioner. The
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presentence custody by affording definition to section 2900.5(b) of the
Penal Code.2 The court held that the petitioner was not entitled to
presentence custody credits against a sentence in California when his
period of time in custody prior to his California convictions had al-
ready been credited to a Florida sentence for unrelated offenses, and
the petitioner had failed to establish that he "would have been at lib-
erty during the period, [of custody] were it not for a restraint relating
to the proceedings resulting in the later [California] sentence."3
Section 2900.5(a) of the Penal Code4 provides that a defendant's
sentence may be reduced by the number of days in which the defend-
ant was held in police custody prior to commencement of his sen-
tence.5  However, section 2900.5(b)6 further stipulates that credit
court of appeal affirmed, and although the supreme court denied a petition for review,
this matter came before the court by an original petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id.
2. See inkfra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
3. Joyner, 48 Cal. 3d at 489, 769 P.2d at 967, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 785. Justice Kauf-
man authored the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Mosk, Panelli, and Eagleson concurred. Justice Broussard dissented separately, joined
by Justice Arguelles..
4.. Section 2900.5(a) provides, in relevant part:
In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when
the defendant has been in custody, including but not limited to any time spent
in a jail ... prison... or similar residential institution, all days of custody of
the defendant ... shall be credited upon his term of imprisonment ....
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5(a), (West 1982). See generally 49 CAL. JUR. 3D Penal and
Correctional Institutions § 147 (1979 & Supp. 1989); 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1995
(1962 & Supp. 1988); California Supreme Court Survey-A Review of Decisions: De-
cember 1982-March 1983, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 187, 237-38 (1983); Comment,
Presentence Custody Time Credit Under California Penal Code Section 2900.5, 3 PEP-
PEftDINE L. REV. 157 (1975); Annotation, Defendant's Right to Credit for Time Spent in
Halfway House, Rehabilitation Center, or Similar Restrictive Environment as a Con-
dition of Pretrial Release, 29 A.L.R. 4TH 240 (1984); Annotation, When is Federal Pris-
oner Entitled; Under 18 USCS § 3568, to Credit for Time Spent in State Custody "In
Connection With" Offense or Acts for Which Federal Sentence Was Imposed, 47
A.L.R. FED. 755 (1980 & Supp. 1989); Annotation, Right of Defendant Sentenced After
Revocation of Probation to Credit for Jail Time Served as Condition of Probation, 99
A.L.R. 3D 781 (1980 & Supp. 1988).
5. The purpose of accrediting a defendant's sentence for presentence custody is
twofold. The first is to eradicate disparate treatment between an indigent defendant
and a wealthy defendant where the former defendant may be unable to post bond and
thus would serve a longer confinement than the latter. See In re Rojas, 23 Cal. 3d 152,
156, 588 P.2d 789, 791, 151 Cal. Rptr. 649, 651 (1979). The second purpose is to equalize
the amount of time served in custody by two defendants who have committed the same
crime. See People v. Riolo, 33 Cal. 3d 223, 228, 655 P.2d 723, 726, 188 Cal. Rptr. 371, 374
(1983).
6. Section 2900.5(b) states:
For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody
to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for
which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a
against a sentence is to be granted only when the custody was attrib-
utable to the proceedings in which the defendant ultimately was con-
victed. The court interpreted this subsection to mean that, if a
defendant is to be granted credit against his sentence, the
presentence custody must be exclusively attributable to the conduct
for which the defendant was convicted. 7 Because the petitioner's cus-
tody in Florida related to both Florida and California offenses, the
California sentence could not be reduced by the number of days he
was held in police custody.8
In denying presentence credits against a sentence unless exclu-
sively attributable to the conduct for which a defendant ultimately
was convicted, the court indicated that it is not willing to reward
those defendants who commit multiple offenses by awarding multiple
presentence custody credits against imposed sentences. The court
simply supports a growing trend9 to maximize the amount of prison
time actually served by criminal offenders.
KATHERINE K. FREBERG
single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecu-
tive sentence is imposed.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5(b) (West 1982) (emphasis added).
7. In reaching the conclusion that the presentence custody must be exclusively
attributable to the proceedings in which the defendant is ultimately convicted, the
court noted that a defendant cannot be granted presentence custody if that defendant
is already serving a prison term for another offense. If a defendant is currently incar-
cerated because of a separate offense, the pending charges have not affected his lib-
erty. See Rojas, 23 Cal. 3d at 155-56, 588 P.2d at 791-92, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 651-52. The
court then observed that presentence custody credits had already been applied against
the petitioner's Florida sentence. Thus, the period of time in which the petitioner was
held in custody by the Florida police was, in effect, a period in which the petitioner
was serving a prison term for another offense. Joyner, 48 Cal. 3d at 492, 769 P.2d at
969, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 787.
8. Justice Broussard, in dissent, argued that the majority's rule would not only
discriminate against indigents, but also prove difficult to administer. Further, he be-
lieved that the statute and developmental case law allow a defendant facing unrelated
charges to receive pretrial custody credit on each charge until the defendant begins to
serve a term on one of them. Joyner, 48 Cal. 3d at 496, 769 P.2d at 972, 256 Cal. Rptr.
at 790 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
9. See United States v. Brown, 753 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Blankenship, 733 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1984); State v. Horrisberger, 133 Ariz. 569, 653 P.2d
26 (1982); State v. Willis, 376 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. 1985); Peterson v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Serv., 100 A.D.2d 73, 473 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1984).
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IV. DEATH PENALTY LAW - SURVEY III
This survey provides an analysis of the California
Supreme Court's automatic review of cases imposing the
death penalty. Rather than a case-by-case approach, this
section focuses on the key issues under review by the
court and identifies trends and shifts in the court's
rationale. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Between January and June of 1989, the California Supreme Court
decided twenty-one death penalty cases.1 During this period the Lu-
cas Court continued its policy of distinguishing harmless error from
prejudicial error, and reversing only upon a finding of actual preju-
dice.2 With this approach, the court reversed the death penalty in six
cases, and vacated with the possibility of reinstatement in another.3
One particularly noteworthy event is the court's implementation of
* This survey is the third in a continuing series of semi-annual surveys of
California death penalty law. For the two previous efforts, see California Supreme
Court Survey-Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 451-85, 1165-1209 (1989).
1. This survey covers the 21 death penalty cases decided between January 5, 1989,
and June 26, 1989. The following cases, listed alphabetically by defendant, form the
basis for this survey: People v. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d 879, 771 P.2d 1294, 258 Cal. Rptr. 208
(1989); People v. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 774 P.2d 659, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1989); Peo-
ple v. Bloom, 48 Cal. 3d 1194, 774 P.2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1989); People v. Bonillas,
48 Cal. 3d 757, 771 P.2d 844, 257 Cal. Rptr. 895, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 288 (1989); Peo-
ple v. Bonin, 47 Cal. 3d 808, 765 P.2d 460, 254 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1989); People v. Boyer, 48
Cal. 3d 247, 768 P.2d 610, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 497 (1989); People v.
Burton, 48 Cal. 3d 843, 771 P.2d 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989); People v. Coleman, 48
Cal. 3d 112, 768 P.2d 32, 255 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1989); People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983,
766 P.2d 1, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1989); People v. Farmer, 47 Cal. 3d 888, 765 P.2d 940, 254
Cal. Rptr. 508, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3158 (1989); People v. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746,
765 P.2d 419, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1989); People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal. 3d 1142, 774 P.2d
730, 259 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1989); People v. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1989); People v. Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 767 P.2d 1047, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569
(1989); People v. Morales, 48 Cal. 3d 527, 770 P.2d 244, 257 Cal. Rptr. 64, cert.denied,
110 S. Ct. 520 (1989); People v. Murtishaw, 48 Cal. 3d 1001, 773 P.2d 172, 258 Cal. Rptr.
821 (1989); People v. Robertson 48 Cal. 3d 18, 767 P.2d 1109, 255 Cal. Rptr. 631, cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 216 (1985); People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal. 3d 935, 771 P.2d 1330, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 242 (1989); In re Sixto, 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 774 P.2d 164, 259 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1989);
People v. Williams, 48 Cal. 3d 1112, 774 P.2d 146, 259 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1989); People v.
Wright, 48 Cal. 3d 168, 768 P.2d 72, 255 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1989). For ease of reference,
subsequent histories are hereinafter omitted, and citation references will include only
the name of each defendant.
2. See California Supreme Court Survey-Death Penalty Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 451 (1989) [hereinafter Death Penalty Law 1].
3. The death penalty was reversed in the cases of Bonillas, Edelbacher, Farmer,
Garrison, Harris, and Wright, and vacated with the possibility of reinstatement in
Sheldon. For citations and subsequent history treatment, see supra note 1.
new policies regarding the procedure and timeliness of habeas corpus
appeals. In addition to an accelerated time frame for habeas peti-
tions, the court has reserved the right to deny the writ if it fails to
meet the new standards and no good cause for the failure can be
shown.4
This survey seeks not only to examine those issues which resulted
in reversal, but also to highlight further developments in areas of
identified trial errors such as Ramos error, Boyd error, Davenport er-
ror, and Brown error.5 This survey also includes a discussion of the
developments in habeas corpus appeals at both the state and federal
levels.
II. NEW CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DEATH PENALTY POLICIES
In an effort to reduce the procedural delays associated with death
penalty appeals6, the California Supreme Court recently adopted a
new set of policies designed to expedite the process.7 Although the
policies include standards for compensating attorneys representing
death row inmates in habeas proceedings, the most controversial part
of the new guidelines is the section dealing with the timeliness stan-
dards for habeas corpus petitions.8
Under standard 1-1, appellate counsel is required to investigate and
file petitions for a writ of habeas corpus "without substantial delay."9
What constitutes "without substantial delay" is defined more specifi-
cally within the standards, which explain that a brief will be pre-
sumed timely if it is filed within sixty days after the appellant's reply
brief on the direct appeal is due.10 However, certain provisions allow
the appeal to be filed even later, provided counsel can show that the
petition was filed within a "reasonable time" after discovery of the
legal and factual basis of the claim.11 If the petitioner is unable to
4. See infra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 118-70 and accompanying text.
6. "Roughly 280 men sit on San Quentin's death row awaiting decisions from the
courts on their appeals." New Death Case Rules Criticized, United Press Int'l, June 7,
1989 (Cal. distribution).
7. Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgements of Death,
48 Cal. 3d 1045a (1989) [hereinafter Supreme Court Policies].
8. See Steiner, Beware New Standards for Death Penalty Appeals, L.A. Daily J.,
Oct. 6, 1989, at 7, col. 1; High Court Acts to Speed Its Review of Capital Cases, L.A.
Times, June 7, 1989, at 3, col. 1 (home ed.); New Death Case Rules Criticized, supra
note 6.
9. Supreme Court Policies, 48 Cal. 3d at 1045a (1989).
10. Standard 1-1.1 states that "[a] petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be pre-
sumed to be filed without substantial delay if it is filed within 60 days after the final
due date for the filing of appellant's reply brief on the direct appeal." Id. at 1045b.
11. Standard 1-1.2 defines the "absence of substantial delay" in filing the writ as
"a reasonable time after petitioner or counsel became aware of information indicating
a factual basis for the claim and became aware, or should have become aware, of the
legal basis for the claim." Id. (emphasis in original).
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meet these requirements or to articulate a good cause for the appeal's
tardiness,12 the court may deny the petition for habeas corpus as un-
timely.13 Thus, the apparent harshness of the timeliness standard is
balanced by the broad discretion reserved by the court. The com-
bined effect of accepting an untimely appeal based upon a showing of
good cause, and providing that an untimely petition may (not will) be
denied, allows the court substantial flexibility to grant a deserving
petition.
In a related effort to decrease delays, the court made clear that
withdrawal of the counsel of record will be allowed only if replace-
ment counsel is "ready and willing" to assume the post-appeal re-
sponsibilities of the case.14 While this action may dissuade some
attorneys from representing defendants in death penalty cases, it
should result in an acceleration of the appellate process.
In response to similar criticisms of delay and abuse in federal death
penalty procedures, a panel chaired by former Supreme Court Jus-
tice Lewis Powell15 recently published a review of habeas corpus pro-
cedures.16 Because of the parallel appellate system for writs of
habeas corpus, a state's ability to carry out a death sentence depends
directly upon federal habeas procedures. 17 Normally, even when the
entire state appellate process has been exhausted, a separate series of
appeals is available in the federal system, which often takes several
years to process.' 8 This situation is aggravated further by a flood of
12. Standard 1-2 also will excuse a delay beyond the normal 60-day filing period
provided that the "petitioner may establish good cause by showing particular circum-
stances sufficient to justify substantial delay." Id.
13. Id. (Standard 1-3).
14. Id. at 1045a.
15. The Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases, led by
former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., was comprised of the following
senior federal judges: Charles Clark, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit; Paul H. Roney, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit; William T. Hodges, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Florida; and Barefoot Sanders, District Judge of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist asked the commit-
tee members to review the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act and to present their findings to the
Judicial Conference of the United States. Panel Seeks New Limits on Death Row Ap-
peals, MANHATAN LAW., Oct. 3-9, 1989, at 15 [hereinafter Panel Seeks New Limits].
16. Nationally, about 2,200 inmates inhabit death row. Since 1976, less than 200
inmates have been put to death, resulting in an average delay of eight years from sen-
tencing to execution. Savage, Panel Would End Death Row Inmates' Multiple Appeals,
L.A. Times, Sept. 22, 1989, at 15, col. 1.
17. The committee, after examining cases from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Missis-
sippi, and Texas, found that 80 percent of the time expended in habeas proceedings
occurs at the federal level. See Panel Seeks New Limits, supra note 15, at 15.
18. In California, a defendant's death sentence is reviewed on automatic appeal to
last minute appeals, accompanied by requests for a stay, as the execu-
tion date approaches.19
The panel has recommended that a petitioner be limited to one de-
tailed review within six months after the conclusion of all state ap-
peals. 20 Furthermore, to ensure that all pertinent issues are
adequately addressed, the panel also recommended that state partici-
pants in the accelerated review be required to provide assistance of
counsel free of charge.21 As of this writing, the Senate Judiciary
Committee has the findings of the panel under consideration for pos-
sible legislative action.22
III. GUILT PHASE ISSUES
Although a broad spectrum of issues23 was raised in the guilt phase
section of the cases surveyed,2 4 only three resulted in reversal.25
the state supreme court, and may receive further review in the United States Supreme
Court. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 4; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1989). The
decision also may be collaterally attacked in the California state court system through
state collateral proceedings. Once the defendant has exhausted all state remedies, the
defendant is entitled to seek relief through federal habeas corpus proceedings, even if
the issues presented have already been decided at the state level. See 39 AM. JUR. 2D
Habeas Corpus § 28 (1968). After the state and federal collateral proceedings have
been decided, the litigation often is extended even further since the defendant is enti-
tled to three petitions for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See Panel
Seeks New Limits, supra note 15, at 15.
19. The committee examined the substance of the cumulative appeals and stays of
executions and found most of them "meritless," as they were filed simply to stall the
judicial process. See Panel Seeks New Limits, supra note 15, at 15. Significantly, the
California Supreme Court's new policies provide that "[t]he court will consider a mo-
tion for a stay of execution only if such a motion is made in connection with a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed in this court, or to permit certiorari review by the
United States Supreme Court." Supreme Court Policies, 48 Cal. 3d at 1045a.
20. Panel Seeks New Limits, supra note 15, at 15. More specifically, the six-month
filing period would not start until counsel had been appointed to represent the defend-
ant. Moreover, the period would be tolled if any properly initiated state proceeding
was still pending. The report also recommended an automatic stay of execution until
either the completion of habeas proceedings or the expiration of the filing period. A
final provision provided for an extension to the filing period upon a showing of "good
cause." Id.
21. Id.
22. On September 21, 1989, the Judicial Conference of the United States decided
to delay consideration of Justice Powell's report until March, 1990. In the meantime,
Chief Justice Rehnquist forwarded the report to the Senate Judiciary Committee, acti-
vating an accelerated congressional consideration schedule. The Chief Justice de-
fended his unilateral action on the basis that his statutory authority to trigger
congressional consideration was not dependent on any ratification by the Judicial Con-
ference as a whole. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1989, § A, at 21, col. 1.
23. The overwhelming majority of issues raised in the guilt phase failed because
either there was no error, or if there was an error, the court found it to be harmless.
For a discussion of the court's policy on harmless error, see Death Penalty Law I,
supra note 2, at 451-52.
24. See supra note 1.
25. Boyer, 48 Cal. 3d 247, 768 P.2d 610, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1989) (illegal detention
and Miranda violation); Sixto, 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 774 P.2d 164, 259 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1989)
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These reversals were the result of fundamental errors in well-settled
areas of the law.26 In the overwhelming majority of cases, the
supreme court upheld the finding of guilt even when reversible error
was found in the separate penalty phase of the case.27 Thus, the
court has continued either finding no error in the proceedings of the
lower courts or, in the event error is found, deeming it nonprejudicial
or harmless.28
In People v. Boyer,29 the jury fixed the sentence at death after find-
ing the defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and two
counts of robbery.30 Boyer was charged with the robbery and murder
of an elderly couple. The charge was supported by his own incrimi-
nating statement made to the police. The timing and characterization
of this statement constituted an error which led to one of the few re-
versals of a guilt-phase conviction. Writing for the majority,31 Justice
Eagleson found that even if the defendant was not in formal custody,
a reasonable person in the defendant's position could have concluded
that he was not free to leave.32 He further explained that the de-
fendant's admission of guilt was the direct result of unduly coercive
interrogation by the police 33 and thus a violation of the defendant's
Miranda rights. 34 The dissent characterized the defendant's state-
(ineffective assistance of counsel); Williams, 48 Cal. 3d 1112, 774 P.2d 146, 259 Cal.
Rptr. 473 (1989) (improper venue).
26. See supra note 25.
27. Aside from Boyer, Sixto, and Williams, see supra note 25, the remainder of
the cases surveyed affirmed the conviction of guilt. However, even when guilt was af-
firmed, the death penalty was reversed in six cases, and vacated with the possibility of
reinstatement in another. See supra note 3.
28. See supra note 23.
29. 48 Cal. 3d 247, 768 P.2d 610, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1989).
30. Id. at 255-56, 768 P.2d at 612, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
31. Justice Eagleson authored the opinion of the majority, which included Chief
Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Arguelles. Justice Panelli dissented
in an opinion joined by Justice Kaufman.
32. Boyer, 48 Cal. 3d at 268, 768 P.2d at 620, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 106. Police officers in
street clothes "accosted" the defendant at his home and took him down to the police
station for further questions. He subsequently was questioned in a small room by two
officers, who first read the defendant his Miranda rights, and then proceeded to inter-
rogate him for over an hour. Id. Justice Eagleson characterized this as one of "the
relatively rare but distressing cases in which the outcome is determined by the consta-
ble's blunders." Id. at 256, 768 P.2d at 612, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
33. Id. at 267, 768 P.2d at 619, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 105; see Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291 (1980) (Miranda violation may occur if it can be established that the police
should have known that their actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating
reaction from the defendant).
34. Id. at 270, 768 P.2d at 621, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 107. Two members of the court
were inclined to show greater deference to the fact-finding ability of the trial court. In
his dissent, Justice Panelli stated that "reasonable inferences deduced from the facts
ment, "I did it," as a spontaneous outburst, and not as the result of
interrogation, thereby placing it beyond the scope of Miranda.35
The supreme court also found reversible error in the denial of a
defendant's timely motion for a change in venue. In People v. Wil-
liams,36 a black defendant accused of the rape, robbery, kidnapping,
and murder of a young white girl was denied a change of venue. 37 In
reaching its conclusion that a "reasonable likelihood [existed] that...
a fair and impartial trial" could not be had without a change in
venue,38 the court examined several factors. First, the court noted
the relatively small population of the county and the overwhelming
majority of whites in its racial composition.39 Second, the court
weighed the relative status of the victim, whose family had some
prominence within the community, against the status of the defend-
ant, a geographical and racial outsider, and found that this relative
status was indeed prejudicial.40 Third, the court considered the na-
ture and gravity of the offense in light of the heightened role of emo-
tions in a capital case. 41 Finally, the court noted that, due to pretrial
publicity, two-thirds of the jurors in the case were acquainted with
media versions of the facts even before the trial had begun.42
Although most of the surveyed cases raised the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel, 43 it was successful in only one case.44 The de-
as found by the trial court are necessarily supported by substantial evidence, and a re-
viewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court."
Id. at 281, 768 P.2d at 629, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (Panelli, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
35. Id. at 283, 768 P.2d at 630, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 116 (Panelli, J., dissenting). Justice
Panelli expressed concern that "the subjective standard used by the majority portends
a severe limitation, if not elimination, of the voluntary, noncustodial police station in-
terview." Id. at 281, 768 P.2d at 629, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 115 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
36. 48 Cal. 3d 1112, 774 P.2d 146, 259 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1989). Justice Kaufman au-
thored the opinion of the court, which was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Mosk, Broussard, Panelli, and Kennard. -Justice Eagleson concurred and dissented
separately.
37. Id. at 1117, 774 P.2d at 147, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
38. Id. at 1132, 774 P.2d at 157, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Although the court remanded
with directions to transfer the case, Justice Eagleson would simply have reversed the
conviction and remanded with instructions for the trial court to reevaluate the proper
venue at present, as the inflammatory situation had long since subsided. Id. at 1140-41,
774 P.2d at 163-64, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91 (Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting).
39. Id. at 1126, 774 P.2d at 153, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 480.
40. Id. at 1129-31, 774 P.2d at 156-57, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 483-84.
41. Id. at 1131, 774 P.2d at 157, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 484. Justice Kaufman observed
that "[w]here the jury in its discretion is responsible for determining whether a de-
fendant lives or dies, the need for juror impartiality is obviously most acute." Id. (em-
phasis in the original).
42. Id. at 1128, 774 P.2d at 155, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
43. Defendants raised the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in the following
cases: Allison, Bittaker, Bloom, Bonillas, Bonin, Burton, Edelbacher, Garrison, John-
son, Sixto, Sheldon, Williams, and Wright. For citations and subsequent history treat-
ment, see supra note 1. For further discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel in
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fendant in In re Sixto 45claimed to have been under the influence of
alcohol and phencyclidine (PCP) when he sodomized and strangled a
young boy. The original counsel representing Sixto failed to have the
defendant's blood tested for alcohol, and did not request further
blood tests for traces of PCP after the government's test was de-
clared negative. 46 Moreover, when Sixto's first counsel withdrew, he
failed to inform the replacement counsel that PCP might still pro-
vide a viable defense of diminished capacity and unconsciousness.
This failure resulted in a poor tactical decision by replacement coun-
sel.47 Therefore, the court concluded that the trial counsel's actions
were unreasonable and prejudicial,48 and the conviction was vacated
and remanded.49
IV. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE ISSUES
In California, the death penalty may not be imposed for first-de-
gree murder unless one of the special circumstances enumerated by
statute is charged and found to be true.50 Although several of the
cases surveyed contained errors in the finding of a special circum-
stance, none required reversal of the death penalty.51
One of the more common. special circumstance errors is the so-
California death penalty cases, see California Supreme Court Survey-Death Penalty
Law, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1165, 1191-96 (1989) [hereinafter Death Penalty Law II].
44. Sixto, 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 774 P.2d 164, 259 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1989). The opinion spec-
ified several elements of ineffective assistance of counsel to be considered under Arti-
cle I, section 16, of the California Constitution. Id. at 1257, 774 P.2d at 169, 259 Cal.
Rptr. at 496. On appeal, the petitioner bears the burden of proof that counsel failed to
properly investigate a particular defense, and that as a consequence of this error the
defendant was inadequately represented. Id. (citing People v. Williams, 44 Cal. 3d 883,
936, 751 P.2d 395, 430-31, 245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 371-72 (1988)). Furthermore, the petitioner
must show that counsel "knew or should have known" that a more detailed investiga-
tion was required. Id. Lastly, the petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's actions
were not the result of a tactical decision "which a reasonably competent, experienced
criminal defense attorney would make." Id. (citing People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142,
158, 599 P.2d 587, 595, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 289 (1979)).
45. 48 Cal. 3d 1247, 774 P.2d 164, 259 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1989). Justice Pahelli authored
the opinion of a unanimous court, which granted habeas corpus relief.
46. Id. at 1258-59, 774 P.2d at 170, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
47. Id. at 1261, 774 P.2d at 171, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
48. Id. at 1264-65, 774 P.2d at 174, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
49. Id. at 1265, 774 P.2d at 174-75, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02.
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West 1988); see 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES
§ 1026C (Supp. 1985).
51. In order to affirm the death penalty, only one special circumstance must be
upheld on appeal. See generally 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1566
(1989). For a general discussion of the bifurcated procedure of a death penalty trial,
see Death Penalty Law I, supra note 2, at 457-59.
called "multiple" multiple-murder finding. Section 190.2(a)(3) of the
California Penal Code provides that if a defendant is convicted of
more than one first- or second-degree murder in the same proceed-
ing, the special circumstance requirement is satisfied.52 The "multi-
ple" multiple-murder error is produced when more than one
multiple-murder special circumstance is alleged.53 Essentially, it
does not matter how many victims have been murdered; as long as
there are two or more, only one charge of multiple murder is
proper.54 The current trend of the court is to treat such an error as
harmless or nonprejudicial because the jury, as a result of the trial, is
fully aware of the murders on which to base its sentence. 55
Five of the cases surveyed presented the same issue on appeal:
whether intent to kill is an essential element of the jury instructions
in a felony-murder special circumstance.5 6 These appeals were
grounded on the holding in Carlos v. Superior Court,57 which re-
quired intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder special cir-
cumstance, regardless of whether the defendant did the actual
killing.58 In People v. Garrison,59 the court reiterated its earlier find-
ing that intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder special
circumstance.6 0 However, when the defendant is merely an aider or
abettor, "intent to kill must be proved before the trier of fact can
find the special circumstance to be true."61 Since the jury in Garri-
son could have reached its verdict by viewing the defendant as an ac-
52. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West 1988) ("The defendant has in this pro-
ceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second
degree.").
53. Justice Broussard, writing as a member of the Bird Court in 1984, commented
that "alleging two special circumstances for a double murder improperly inflates the
risk that the jury will arbitrarily impose the death penalty .... People v. Harris, 36
Cal. 3d 36, 67, 679 P.2d 433, 452, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 801, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 965 (1984).
However, the overwhelming majority of recent decisions has described the error as
harmless or nonprejudicial. See, e.g., Bloom (two of three multiple-murder special cir-
cumstances vacated); Bonin (nine of ten multiple murder special circumstances va-
cated); Garrison (one of two multiple murder special circumstances vacated);
Hamilton (one of two multiple murder special circumstances vacated). For citations
and subsequent history treatment, see supra note 1.
54. People v. Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d 123, 144, 756 P.2d 1348, 1359, 249 Cal. Rptr. 320,
330 (1988).
55. See supra note 54.
56. See Bonillas, Burton, Harris, Garrison, and Johnson. For citations and subse-
quent history treatment, see supra note 1.
57. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
58. Id. at 153-54, 672 P.2d at 877, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
59. 47 Cal. 3d 746, 765 P.2d 419, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1989).
60. Id. at 789, 765 P.2d at 442, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 280. The court cited People v. An-
derson, 43 Cal. 3d '1104, 1147, 742 P.2d 1306, 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 611 (1987), which
stated "we overrule Carlos and hold as follows: intent to kill is not an element of the
felony-murder special circumstance; but when the defendant is an aider and abettor
rather than the actual killer, intent must be proved." Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d at 789, 765
P.2d at 442, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
61. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d at 789, 765 P.2d at 442, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
[Vol. 17: 523, 1990] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
complice, the trial court's failure to instruct on intent to kill was
indeed an instructional error.62 However, the court found that the
requisite intent was necessarily included in the jury's verdict of guilt
regarding the witness-killing special circumstance.6 3
V. PENALTY PHASE ISSUES
A. Differences Between the 1977 and the 1978 Death Penalty Laws
In People v. Murtishaw,64 the court further clarified its position on
the differences between the 1977 death penalty statute and the 1978
modifications resulting from the Briggs death penalty initiative.65
The court concluded that while it is improper to use 1978 sentencing
instructions in cases subject to the 1977 statute, it does not automati-
cally constitute reversible error.66
Although Murtishaw killed three college students in 1978, he was
subject to the 1977 statute because the 1978 initiative had not yet be-
come law.6 7 Consequently, the supreme court found that the trial
court had erred by giving sentencing instructions based on the 1978
version of the law instead of its predecessor.68 Nevertheless, the
court determined that since the error was not prejudicial, no cause
existed for reversal. 69
In 1977, after mandatory death penalty laws had been declared un-
62. Id.
63. Id. at 790, 765 P.2d at 442-43, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 280-81.
64. 48 Cal. 3d 1001, 773 P.2d 172, 258 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1989).
65. Former section 190.3 read, in relevant part, "after having heard and received
all of the evidence, the trier of fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section, and shall de-
termine whether the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of parole." Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 316, § 7, 1977 Cal. Stat. 1257 (emphasis added).
The 1978 version expands the above italicized portion to read:
[T]he trier of fact ... shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact con-
cludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances. If the trier of fact determines that the mitigating circumstances
outweigh the aggravating circumstances the trier of fact shall impose a sen-
tence of confinement in a state prison for a term of life without the possibility
of parole.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); see also Death Penalty Law I, supra note 2, at
462-66.
66. Murtishaw, 48 Cal. 3d at 1025, 773 P.2d at 186, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
67. Id. The murders were committed in April 1978, which was prior to the No-
vember 8, 1978, effective date of the Briggs Initiative.
68. Id.
69. Id.
constitutional,70 the California legislature enacted a modified death
penalty statute. The 1977 version of section 190.3 of the Penal Code
instructed the trier of fact to "take into account and be guided by the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances . . . and [tor determine
whether the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment without pa-
role."71 The court in Murtishaw observed that under the 1978 ver-
sion of section 190.3, the trier of fact shall impose the death penalty if
it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. 72 Murtishaw claimed that under the 1978 version, a
juror was prevented from finding that the death penalty was unwar-
ranted as long as the aggravating circumstances outweighed those in
mitigation.73 However, because of the court's contrary holding in
Brown ,74 this argument was rejected.75
In Brown I, the court explained that the statute simply requires
the jury to consider and individually weigh all the circumstances in
order to determine whether the circumstances in aggravation out-
weigh those in mitigation.76 In fact, if the court had interpreted the
1978 version of the statute to restrict the trier of fact's discretion to
consider all of the circumstances of the case, as well as to ascribe
whatever relative weight the jurors believed appropriate to these
considerations, it would have violated the United States
Constitution.77
Trial courts now are required to inform the jury of both the
bounds of its discretion and its responsibility to consider the totality
of the circumstances in reaching a decision.78 Courts generally sat-
70. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). For a detailed synopsis of Furman,
see 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 947D-L (Supp. 1985).
71. Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 316, § 7, 1977 Cal. Stat. 1256, 1260; see supra note 66.
72. Murtishaw, 48 Cal. 3d at 1025, 773 P.2d at 186, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
73. Id. at 1026, 773 P.2d at 186-87, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 835-36. A scholar of linguistics
observed that the use of the word "shall" in the 1978 version confused the jury about
its duty. "Therefore, to be sure of conveying the law correctly, the instructions should
contain not only may but also an addendum along these lines: 'Where the aggravation
outweighs mitigation, you are permitted to impose the death penalty-but are not re-
quired to do so.'" Lakoff, Life or Death Confusion in the Law, L.A. Times, Jan. 3,
1986, Part II, at 5, col. 3 (emphasis in original).
74. People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985), rev'd
on other grounds, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
75. Murtishaw, 48 Cal. 3d at 1027, 773 P.2d at 187, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
76. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d at 538-44, 709 P.2d at 453-59, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 650-56. For a
more detailed discussion of Brown in the context of the Briggs Initiative, see G.
UELMEN, CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY LAWS AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT: A
TEN YEAR PERSPECTIVE 55-59 (1986).
77. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716 (1987), (statutes which impose
mandatory death penalty for a specific category of defendants violate the eighth and
fourteenth amendments); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (statutory
constructions which have the effect of making the death penalty mandatory for a cate-
gory of crimes violate the eighth and fourteenth amendments).
78. Murtishaw, 48 Cal. 3d at 1028, 773 P.2d at 188, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
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isfy this requirement by giving the current, modified version of
CALJIC Instruction 8.84.1. 79 However, for those cases decided under
the 1978 Briggs Initiative and prior to Brown I in 1985, the court will
continue to scrutinize each appeal on a case-by-case basis to ensure
that the defendant's rights were not abridged by the error.80
B. Automatic Motion for Modification of the Verdict
Whenever a jury returns a verdict imposing the death penalty, the
trial court must, of its own accord, consider a motion to modify the
verdict.81 This rule actually has two aspects: the underlying author-
ity of the court to modify the verdict in a criminal case,82 and the re-
quirement that the trial court address the issue sua sponte. 83
Previously, in People v. Williams,8 4 the supreme court analyzed
section 1385 of the California Penal Code,8 5 which provides the trial
court with the authority to dismiss an action on its own motion if it is
in the interests of justice and the legislature has not evidenced a con-
trary intent.8 6 The court in Williams concluded that the statute also
79. "Both the People and the Defendant have a right to expect that you will con-
sider all of the evidence .... " CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (West Supp. 1989).
80. Murtishaw, 48 Cal. 3d at 1028, 773 P.2d at 188-89, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38; see
also G. UELMEN, supra note 76, at 56.
81. See 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3347 (1985); Death Penalty Law II, supra
note 43, at 1196-98.
82. Section 1385(a) states in part, "[tihe judge or magistrate may, either of his or
her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in further-
ance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (West
Supp. 1989).
83. Section 190.4(e) states in part:
In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or finding im-
posing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an ap-
plication for modification of such verdict or finding pursuant to Subdivision 7
of Section 11. In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evi-
dence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a
determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravat-
ing circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law
or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for
his findings.
Id. § 190.4(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
84. 30 Cal. 3d 470, 637 P.2d 1029, 179 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1981).
85. Although the statute itself speaks in terms of dismissing an "action," see supra
note 82, the language has been interpreted to allow the rejection of a portion of the
verdict, namely the finding of a particular special circumstance. Williams, 30 Cal. 3d
at 489, 637 P.2d at 1039-40,"179 Cal. Rptr. at 453-54. Use of the word "shall" in section
190.4(e) cannot be construed to indicate a legislative intent to deny the courts their use
of discretion under § 1385(a). Id.; see supra note 83.
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West Supp. 1989).
gives the trial court the authority to dismiss a special circumstance
finding even if it modifies the verdict from life without parole to life
with the possibility of parole.8 7
Section 190.4(e) of the California Penal Code requires a judge to
consider automatically a motion to modify in a death penalty case.88
The judge must conduct a separate review to determine whether the
death penalty is appropriate and then state the reasons for his or her
findings on the record.8 9 In People v. Bonillas,90 the trial judge's fail-
ure to properly consider the automatic motion to modify caused the
court to vacate the death sentence and remand the case for further
consideration.91
In Bonillas, the supreme court believed the trial judge erred in
failing to conduct a separate and independent review 92 of whether
the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circum-
stances.93 Rather, the judge simply found that the jury had not mis-
applied the law in determining that the aggravating circumstances
87. Williams, 30 Cal. 3d at 490, 637 P.2d at 1040, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 454. The court
did not directly decide that section 1385 allowed modification of a special circumstance
after the jury returns a death sentence. Id. at 490 n.11, 637 P.2d at 1040 n.11, 179 Cal.
Rptr. at 454 n.il.
88. See supra note 83.
89. Section 190.4(e) of the California Penal Code further provides, in part, that
"[t]he judge shall set forth the reasons for his ruling on the application and direct that
they be entered on the Clerk's minutes." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (West 1988).
90. 48 Cal. 3d 757, 771 P.2d 844, 257 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1989).
91. Id. at 802, 771 P.2d at 870-71, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22. The supreme court speci-
fied that the original trial judge should consider the case on remand if at all possible;
otherwise, another judge of the same court could hear the motion. Id. at 801 n.14, 771
P.2d at 870 n.14, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 921 n.14.
92. The idea that section 190.4(e) requires a separate and independent review is
the result of an interesting evolution. In People v. Frierson, 25 Cal. 3d 142, 599 P.2d
587, 158 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1979), the California Supreme Court observed that Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), required some sort of review in capital punishment cases
to guard against imposing sentences "capriciously or in a freakish manner." Frierson,
25 Cal. 3d at 178, 599 P.2d at 608, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 302 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195).
The court noted that an independent review by the trial judge was an important part
of this process. Id. at 179, 599 P.2d at 608, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 302. Next, in People v.
Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986), the court examined
the reference to "Subdivision 7 of Section 11" in the automatic motion for modification
provision of section 190.4(e). See supra note 84. Section 11 provides no support for the
statute because its topics are unrelated to the substance of § 190.4(e), and it does not
have a subdivision 7. As a result, the court determined that the statute referred to sec-
tion 1181, subdivision 7, concerning modification of verdicts. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d at
792 n.25, 726 P.2d at 154 n.25, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 708 n.25.
In a related interpretation of construction, the Rodriguez court found that even
though the word "independent" was omitted in the 1978 version of section 190.4(e),
which had been included in the former 1977 version, the section must be construed to
require independent review to comply with constitutional mandates. Id. at 794, 726
P.2d at 155, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 709; see also People v. Thompson, 45 Cal. 3d 86, 140, 753
P.2d 37, 71, 246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 279, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 404 (1988) (trial judge must
conduct independent review).
93. Bonillas, 48 Cal. 3d at 801, 771 P.2d at 870, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
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outweighed those in mitigation. 94 The trial judge stated, "I don't
think I have any right in that situation to reverse the verdict of the
jury, and I'm not going to do so at this time."95 But, as Justice Kauf-
man indicated, the trial judge was mistaken about his authority
under the law.96 The obligation imposed upon the trial judge under
section 190.4(e) extends beyond a basic finding that the jury's verdict
is supported by the evidence.97 Instead, the judge must indepen-
dently reweigh the evidence; then if a conflict exists between the
judge's findings and those of the jury, the judge has a duty to modify
the verdict.98 Since the trial judge might have modified the jury's
verdict had he been aware of his authority, the case was remanded
for further consideration.99
The supreme court also noted the trial judge's failure in Bonillas to
specifically state his reasons for denying the automatic motion to
modify.100 Such findings are required by statute1 01 because they
guarantee the defendant proper consideration of the automatic mo-
tion to modify and allow the reviewing court an opportunity to super-
vise the process on appeal.102 The court found that generalized
statements, even when coupled with obvious familiarity with the evi-
dence, do not fulfill the statutory requirements. 0 3
The decision in People v. Hamilton 104 demonstrates the usefulness
of this requirement. After examining the trial judge's detailed find-
ings, the supreme court was able to determine that the trial judge
had erroneously considered the lack of extenuating evidence to be an
aggravating factor and had failed to consider other mitigating evi-
dence.105 Nevertheless, because the trial court had considered each
94. Id. at 800-01, 771 P.2d at 870, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
95. Id. at 801, 771 P.2d at 870, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 921 (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
97. See supra note 83.
98. Bonillas, 48 Cal. 3d at 801, 771 P.2d at 870, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 921. The trial
court has both the power and the obligation to modify the verdict when its own find-
ings disagree with the jury's. Id.
99. Id. The trial court was specifically instructed to reconsider the judgment of
death and to properly apply its own findings in accordance with section 190.4(e),
although it retained the authority to reinstate the death penalty if appropriate. Id. at
801, 771 P.2d at 870-71, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 921-22.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
102. Bonillas, 48 Cal. 3d at 801, 771 P.2d at 870, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
103. Id.
104. 48 Cal. 3d 1142, 774 P.2d 730, 259 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1989).
105. Id. at 1186, 774 P.2d at 757, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
of the factors mandated by the statute 0 6 and had placed them on the
record, the supreme court found the analytical errors harmless. 0 7
However, in People v. Allison,10s the trial judge entered nothing
more than a conclusory finding regarding his consideration of the
motion to modify. 0 9 Although the prosecutor requested that the
judge indicate for the record that the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed those in mitigation, the judge failed to state the reasons for
his conclusions.110 Under such circumstances, the supreme court typ-
ically vacates the judgment of death and remands for further consid-
eration."l' However, in Allison, this avenue was foreclosed because
the original trial judge had died in the interim.112 Rather than re-
manding the case to another trial judge, the supreme court opted to
analyze the situation for prejudicial error.
The court noted, on the one hand, that the murder had occurred in
the course of a robbery, thereby satisfying the special circumstance
requirement and creating an aggravating factor.11 3 On the other
hand, none of the statutory mitigating factors were present except
for the defendant's youth and his general character evidence. 1 4 Con-
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1187, 774 P.2d at 757, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
108. 48 Cal. 3d 879, 771 P.2d 1294, 258 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1989).
109. Id. at 909-10, 771 P.2d at 1316-17, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29. Another one of the
cases surveyed, People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal. 3d 935, 771 P.2d 1330, 258 Cal. Rptr. 242
(1989), was similarly remanded because the judge failed to state his reasons for deny-
ing the automatic motion to modify. The court explained that the original judge
should rehear the motion personally, state his reasons for the record, and either rein-
state the death penalty or modify the sentence to life without parole. Id. at 963, 771
P.2d at 1346, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
110. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d at 910, 771 P.2d at 1316, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
111. The supreme court could have remanded the case even though the original
judge was dead. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1053 (West 1985). Essentially, section 1053
provides a replacement judge with the same authority as an original judge replaced
due to illness or death. Id.
112. The court recently decided a case presenting the same issue. In People v.
Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d 147, 753 P.2d 629, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1988), the trial court judge
died prior to the supreme court's decision. In Heishman, the court underscored its dis-
cretion to remand by stating, "Unfortunately, the trial judge is no longer alive. If he
were, we would remand for a new hearing on the verdict-modification application Sim-
ply out of an abundance of caution .... " Allison, 48 Cal. 3d at 910, 771 P.2d at 1316,
258 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (quoting Heishman, 45 Cal. 3d at 200, 753 P.2d at 665, 246 Cal.
Rptr. at 709) (emphasis added). The court cited both the conservation of judicial re-
sources and the elimination of delay as primary reasons for returning the case to a
judge already familiar with it. Id.
113. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d at 912, 771 P.2d at 1317, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
114. Factors (d) through (j) of section 190.3 of the California Penal Code are ele-
ments to be considered in mitigation. Factor (i) refers to the age of the defendant
when the crime was committed. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(i) (West 1988). Because the
defendant in Allison was 25 years old at the time he robbed and murdered his victim,
age was a minor consideration. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d at 912, 771 P.2d at 1317, 258 Cal,
Rptr. at 230. The court also considered general evidence introduced at trial in compli-
ance with section 190.3(k). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988). With regard
to factor (k), defense counsel offered evidence, which the supreme court discounted,
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sequently, the court held that there was no prejudice to the defend-
ant since the aggravating circumstances clearly outweighed those in
mitigation.
1 15
C. Ramos Error
Even though the Briggs instruction was declared unconstitutional
in 1984,116 the court is still facing the issue on appeal because of the
delays associated with death penalty cases.11 7 Of the cases surveyed,
two were reversed due to Ramos error.118
In People v. Garrison,"9 the court reiterated its holding in Ramos
that introduction of the Briggs instruction, without additional in-
structions to cure the error, is a violation of the guarantee of funda-
mental fairness required under the state constitution. i 2o Because the
jury had received an unadorned Briggs instruction, the court re-
versed Garrison's death sentence.' 2 '
that the defendant was a good son and the product of a broken home. Allison, 48 Cal.
3d at 912, 771 P.2d at 1318, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 230. For a general discussion of "factor
(k)," see Death Penalty Law I, supra note 2, at 459-62; Death Penalty Law II, supra
note 43, at 1174-76:
115. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d at 912, 771 P.2d at 1318, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
116. The 1978 Briggs Initiative directed the trier of fact to consider the possibility
of parole or commutation by the governor when deciding whether or not to impose the
death penalty. In People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1982), rev'd sub nom. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), the California Supreme
Court found that the Briggs instruction was misleading and that it could bias the trier
of fact toward imposing a judgment of death. Id. at 600-01, 639 P.2d at 936, 180 Cal.
Rptr. at294. The court also found that the Briggs instruction violated the fifth, eighth,
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution. Id. The United States
Supreme Court subsequently reversed, finding no constitutional violation, and re-
manded the case for further consideration. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1014. On remand, the
California Supreme Court once again held the Briggs instruction unconstitutional, but
this time it based its findings on the due process clause of the California Constitution.
People v. Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d 136, 143, 689 P.2d 430, 432, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (1984);
see G. UELMEN, supra note 76, at 53-54; Death Penalty Law I, supra note 2, at 466-68;
Death Penalty Law II, supra note 43, at 1167-71.
117. The text of the Briggs instruction reads as follows:
You are instructed that under the state Constitution, a governor is empowered
to grant a reprieve, pardon or commutation after sentence following convic-
tion of a crime. Under this power a governor may in the future commute or
modify a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to a lesser
sentence that would include the possibility of parole.
CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (West 1979).
118. Garrison, 47 Cal. 3d 746, 765 P.2d 419, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1989); Harris, 47 Cal.
3d 1047, 767 P.2d 619, 255 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1989).
119. 47 Cal. 3d 746, 765 P.2d 419, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1989).
120. Id. at 794, 765 P.2d at 445, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 284 (quoting Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d at
153, 689 P.2d at 439-40, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 809-10).
121. Id. at 795, 765 P.2d at 446, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
In a similar situation, the state argued that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the Briggs instruction because of defense counsel's re-
marks indicating that commutation was highly unlikely.122 During
the trial, the defense had characterized the hope of commutation as a
"cruel hoax," and had argued further that if the defendant received a
sentence of life without parole, he would "never walk the streets
again."'123 Nevertheless, the supreme court deemed the instruction
reversible error. 124 The court noted that the Briggs instruction
forced defense counsel to emphasize the instruction in his arguments
in order to overcome it, which served only to focus the jury's atten-
tion on the instruction, rather than to minimize its effect. 125
However, in People v. Bonillas, 126 the court found no Ramos error
because the trial judge, in response to an inquiry by the jury, refused
to allow the jurors to consider parole or commutation in their delib-
erations.127 The defendant argued that the trial court had erred in
light of Ramos, which suggests that a judge respond to such an in-
quiry by explaining that commutation applies to both death and life
without parole.128 Furthermore, the defendant claimed the judge
erred in failing to specifically state that life without parole means
that the defendant may not be paroled at a later date.129 The court
held that the suggestions in Ramos were not mandatory and that the
trial court's actions were fundamentally correct because the jury
never was actually exposed to the Briggs instruction.130
The court also declined to find Ramos error in People v. Bit-
taker,13 1 even though the prosecutor had stated that the defendant
could not be rehabilitated.132 In the original trial, the prosecutor re-
marked that the defendant "would never be rehabilitated. He would
just go out and do the same thing again."'133 On appeal, the defend-
ant argued that such a statement implied that the defendant might
later be released despite a sentence of life without parole. 34 The
court held that without a more specific reference to parole or com-
mutation, the defendant could not have suffered any prejudice.135
122. Harris, 47 Cal. 3d at 1101, 767 P.2d at 654, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1102, 767 P.2d at 654-55, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
125. Id.
126. 48 Cal. 3d 757, 771 P.2d 844, 257 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1989).
127. Id. at 797-98, 771 P.2d at 868, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
128. Id. at 798, 771 P.2d at 868, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 774 P.2d 659, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1989).
132. Id. at 1110 n.35, 774 P.2d at 697 n.35, 259 Cal, Rptr. at 668 n.35.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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D. Boyd Error
In Lockett v. Ohio,136 the United States Supreme Court held that
jurors must be allowed to consider any part of the defendant's char-
acter or record which constitutes a mitigating factor. 137 At the time,
it was argued that the scope of mitigating considerations in the 1978
death penalty law was too narrow to comply with the holding in
Lockett.138 In 1983, the California Supreme Court responded to the
challenges of the constitutionality of the 1978 death penalty stat-
ute,139 and held that the jury should be instructed to consider all fac-
tors in mitigation based on a more liberal reading of factor (k).140 In
other words, factor (k) was interpreted to encompass the broader
range of mitigating concerns mandated by the United States Supreme
Court.
This broad interpretation does not extend to aggravating circum-
stances. Only those aggravating circumstances specifically enumer-
ated in the statute may be considered by the jury. 141 Boyd error142
occurs when the trier of fact considers circumstances in aggravation
which extend beyond those factors specifically listed in the statutory
scheme.143
136. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
137. In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death.
Id. at 110 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of
Lockett and Eddings, see Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Debating the Constitutionality
of Juvenile Executions, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 737, 740-41 (1989).
138. See People v. Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d 762, 775, 700 P.2d 782, 791, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10
(1985).
139. Id.
140. Id.; see notes 200-13 and accompanying text for an explanation and discussion
of "factor k."
141. Id. In Robertson, 48 Cal. 3d 18, 767 P.2d 1109, 255 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1989), the
court distinguished Boyd error under the 1977 statute from the interpretation allowed
under the 1978 version. The trier of fact under the 1977 statute was allowed to con-
sider "'any matter relevant to . . . the defendant's character, background, history,
mental condition and physical condition.'" Id. at 51, 767 P.2d at 1127, 255 Cal. Rptr. at
649 (quoting People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 777, 631 P.2d 446, 472, 175 Cal. Rptr.
738, 764 (1981)). Consequently, the court found that the trial court's consideration of
the defendant's violation of his probation status and therapy participation was proper
since it was authorized by the former statute. In contrast, the current statute limits
the consideration to those factors specifically enumerated in section 190.3 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code.
142. See Boyd, 38 Cal. 3d at 762, 700 P.2d at 782, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 1.
143. Id. at 775, 700 P.2d at 791-92, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 10-11.
In People v. Wright, 1 4 4 the court reversed the judgment of death
and remanded the case for a new penalty phase trial due to prejudi-
cial Boyd error. 145 During the original trial, the prosecution
presented nine different witnesses who testified about threats the de-
fendant had made and his general misconduct while incarcerated.
Most notably, the defendant purportedly admitted to a correctional
counselor that he liked to do "freaky things" to women. 146 The pros-
ecutor drew particular attention to this remark in his closing argu-
ment when he stated, "I'm sure everybody would agree that raping a
76-year-old woman as she lay dying on the floor in a pool of blood is
pretty freaky."'147 Although the state sought to characterize the dam-
aging testimony as harmless error, the court found it clearly prejudi-
cial. 14 s Moreover, the court found the witnesses' testimony to be
outside the scope of the statutory aggravating factors, thus creating
Boyd error.149
In an important distinction, the court explained that Boyd error is
based on statutory interpretation. 150 The majority recognized that
while it might be reasonable-and constitutional-to allow the jury
to consider an inmate's past performance in prison, any change in the
law must be left to the legislature, not the judiciary.151
The dissent, however, argued that the testimony in question was
properly admissible under the language of factor (b) of section 190.3
of the California Penal Code.152 Factor (b) specifically addresses
"[t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant
which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the
express or implied threat to use force or violence."'5 3 The dissent
concluded that the bulk of the testimony plainly fell within the statu-
tory scheme, and that the court had "never held that Boyd ... error
alone could constitute reversible error."154
The prosecution's graphic remarks in People v. Bittaker 5 5 also
raised the issue of Boyd error. In discussing the victim's murder, the
prosecutor stated: "And then her body is thrown over so that the
coyotes and the maggots and the beetles can finish her off so that no-
body will find her .. .not even a body for her parents to give a de-
144. 48 Cal. 3d 168, 768 P.2d 72, 255 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1989).
145. Id. at 220, 768 P.2d at 104, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
146. Id. at 214, 768 P.2d at 100-01, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 881-82.
147. Id. at 217, 768 P.2d at 102, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
148. Id. at 215-19, 768 P.2d at 101-04, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 882-85.
149. Id. at 215, 768 P.2d at 101, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
150. Id. at 215 n.21, 768 P.2d at 101 n.21, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 882 n.21.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 221, 768 P.2d at 106, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Eagleson, J., dissenting).
153. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(b) (West 1988).
154. Wright, 48 Cal. 3d at 222, 768 P.2d at 106, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Eagleson, J.,
dissenting).
155. 48 Cal. 3d 1046, 774 P.2d 659, 259 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1989).
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cent burial."156 On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor
exceeded the bounds of the statutory aggravating factors mandated
by Boyd.157 The court, however, found the prosecutor's remarks
properly admissible under factor (a) of section 190.3,158 which allows
disclosure of the circumstances of the crime.159 The court particu-
larly observed that "the manner in which a murderer disposes of the
victim's body" is relevant under factor (a).160 Furthermore, the pros-
ecutor is permitted to make an emotional appeal as long as the re-
marks are confined to relevant matters.161
Likewise, in People v. Burton,162 the court declined to find that the
admission of a prior violent juvenile adjudication during the original
trial constituted Boyd error. The defense argued that a juvenile adju-
dication cannot be considered a felony conviction under factor (c)1 63
because section 203 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code164
prohibits the treatment of a juvenile proceeding as a crime.165 The
defense also claimed that it was improper to characterize the defend-
ant's juvenile transgressions as violent criminal activity within the
meaning of factor (b).166
The court agreed that a juvenile adjudication is not a felony, and
thus factor (c) did not apply.16 7 However, the court was unpersuaded
with respect to factor (b).168 In determining that a prior juvenile ad-
judication involving violence should be allowed under factor (b), the
court observed that "[iut is not the adjudication, but the conduct it-
156. Id at 1110 n.35, 774 P.2d at 697 n.35, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 668 n.35.
157. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
158. Section 190.3(a) allows consideration of "[tlhe circumstances of the crime of
which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any
special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.3(a) (West 1988) (emphasis added).
159. Bittaker, 48 Cal. 3d at 1110 n.35, 774 P.2d at 697 n.35, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 668 n.35.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 864, 640 P.2d 776, 790, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 640, 654 (1982).
162. 48 Cal. 3d 843, 771 P.2d 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989).
163. Section 190.3(c) allows consideration of "[t]he presence or absence of any prior
felony conviction." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(c) (West 1985).
164. Section 203 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that "[a]n order ad-
judging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of
a crime for any purpose .... " CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West 1984).
165. Burton, 48 Cal. 3d at 861, 771 P.2d at 128i, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
166. Id.; see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
167. Burton, 48 Cal. 3d at 861, 771 P.2d at 1281, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
168. Id. at 862, 771 P.2d at 1282, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
self, which is relevant."169 As a result, the court found the restric-
tions imposed by section 203 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
inapplicable to the admissibility of violent juvenile misconduct under
factor (b).170
E. Davenport Error
Simply stated, Davenport error occurs whenever the absence of a
mitigating factor is argued as an aggravating factor.171 For example,
if the defense is unable to prove that the defendant was under duress
at the time the murder was committed, the prosecution may not ar-
gue this lack of mitigation as a factor in aggravation.
In People v. Allison,172 the prosecutor clearly committed Daven-
port error when he argued that the absence of evidence under six of
the eleven statutory mitigating factors should be considered aggravat-
ing factors.173 In Allison, the prosecutor cited the absence of emo-
tional or mental disturbance, victim participation or consent, duress,
and an inability to understand wrongfulness of the crime as factors in
aggravation. 174 Since these factors may be argued only in mitigation,
the prosecutor's argument clearly was erroneous. 175 Despite this im-
proper argument, the court did not reverse the defendant's death
sentence. 176 In addition to finding the error harmless, the court cited
two reasons in support of its holding: (1) because the defendant failed
to object to the prosecutorial misconduct in the lower court, his ob-
jection was barred on appeal; and (2) the Davenport ruling, which oc-
curred two years after the defendant's trial, has not been applied
retroactively. 177
In People v. Robertson,178 the defendant claimed that Davenport
169. Id (quoting People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259, 295-96 n.24, 753 P.2d 1052, 1075
n.24, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 24 n.24 (1988)).
170. Id.
171. See People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 289-90, 710 P.2d 861, 888, 221 Cal. Rptr.
794, 821 (1985). See generally Death Penalty Law I, supra note 2, at 471-73; Death Pen-
alty Law II, supra note 43, at 1190.
172. 48 Cal. 3d 879, 771 P.2d 1294, 258 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1989).
173. Id. at 902, 771 P.2d at 1311, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
174. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(d), (e), (g), (h) (West 1988).
175. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d at 902, 771 P.2d at 1311, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 225; see also Hamil-
ton, 48 Cal. 3d 1142, 1184, 774 P.2d 730, 755, 259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 726 (1989) (absence of
factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j) may not be cited in aggravation).
176. Allison, 48 Cal. 3d at 902, 771 P.2d at 1311, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
177. Id. The court also made two consistent related rulings during the survey pe-
riod. In Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983, 766 P.2d 1, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1989), the court held
that in a "pre-Davenport" case, failure to object based upon Davenport error did not
bar the court from review, because counsel might have been unaware of the possible
objection. Id. at 1035 n.16, 766 P.2d at 33 n.16, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 618 n.16. However, the
court held that failure to object after Davenport constitutes a waiver of the issue.
Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 1247, 767 P.2d 1047, 1075, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 597 (1989).
178. 48 Cal. 3d 18, 767 P.2d 1109, 255 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1989).
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error occurred when the trial court stated, just prior to a discussion
of aggravating factors, that the defense had failed to establish two
factors in mitigation.179 Finding no grounds to support a claim of
Davenport error, the court reasoned that merely observing the fail-
ure to prove a mitigating factor is substantially different from repre-
senting the absence of a mitigating consideration as an aggravating
factor.180
The supreme court also rejected the assertion of Davenport error
in People v. Burton.I8 1 The alleged error occurred when the prosecu-
tion argued that the defendant's status as an accomplice should be
considered an aggravating factor. Although this argument is imper-
missible under factor (j), it may be proper under different circum-
stances. 8 2 The court reasoned that since the mistake occurred only
once and the jury could have properly received the same information
under factor (a), there was "no reasonable possibility the jury was
misled."183
F Brown Error
Brown error originally developed from the court's concern that the
language in section 190.3 of the Penal Code might mislead the jury
about its responsibilities in the "weighing process" when considering
whether aggravation outweighs mitigation. 8 4 The former jury in-
struction informed jurors that if aggravating factors outweighed miti-
gating factors, then they "shall impose a sentence of death."185 A
literal reading of the statute might mislead the jury into simply
counting up relevant factors, which would eliminate the breadth of
179. Id. at 50, 767 P.2d at 1126-27, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 648-49.
180. Id.
181. 48 Cal. 3d 843, 771 P.2d 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989).
182. Id. at 865, 771 P.2d at 1284, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 198. Factor (j) focuses on
"[w]hether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation
in the commission of the offense was relatively minor." CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(j)
(West 1988). Although arguing that the defendant was not an accomplice is improper,
it could be tempered in an argument concerning "[tihe circumstances of the crime of
which the defendant was convicted .... Id. § 190.3(a) (West 1988).
183. Burton, 48 Cal. 3d at 865, 771 P.2d at 1284, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 198; see supra note
182.
184. See People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 538-44, 709 P.2d 440, 453-59, 220 Cal. Rptr.
637, 650-56 (1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538
(1987).
185. CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (West 1979). After Brown, the following clarifying lan-
guage was added to the instruction to eliminate any confusion: "You are free to assign
whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the vari-
ous factors you are permitted to consider." CALJIC No. 8.88 (West 1988).
its discretion in deciding whether or not the death penalty is appro-
priate. To properly evaluate factors in aggravation, versus those in
mitigation, the jurors must be aware that they are free to attach to
the factors whatever value they see fit under the circumstances and
in light of their own personal experiences as members of the
community.1 8 6
Although six of the twenty-one cases surveyed claimed Brown er-
ror on appeal,187 it constituted reversible error in only People v.
Edelbacher.X88 Because the trial in Edelbacher took place before
Brown had been decided, the jury was instructed with the unmodi-
fied language of section 190.3 of the Penal Code.189 The supreme
court observed that the trial judge had declined to provide the clari-
fying instruction suggested by the defense, which would have in-
formed the jury of its discretion to assign to each factor whatever
weight it deemed appropriate. 190 The court also noted that the prose-
cutor's arguments had erroneously implied that the death penalty
should be imposed if the defendant's bad qualities overshadowed his
good qualities. Instead, the prosecutor should have counseled the
jury to impose the death penalty only if the defendant's bad qualities
were so extreme that death was more appropriate than life without
parole.191 Because the jury possibly could have been misled, the
court found reversible error.192
In People v. Burton,193 the defendant raised Brown error in the
prosecutor's closing arguments and the trial court's instructions. Spe-
cifically, both the prosecutor and the trial judge had told the jurors
that they must return a verdict of death if they concluded that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed those in mitigation. 9 4 On ap-
peal, the defendant argued that the prosecution's emphasis on the
mandatory wording of the statute might have misled the jurors into
believing they were acting "merely as factfinder, not as conscience of
the community."195 The defendant also argued that the prosecutor
further confused the jurors by stating that they must follow the law
"whether [they] like it or not."'196
186. For further discussion and background information, see generally Death Pen-
alty Law I, supra note 2, at 462-66; Death Penalty Law II, supra note 43, at 1171-74.
187. The following cases claimed Brown error: Allison, Bonillas, Bonin, Burton,
Edelbacher, and Murtishaw. See supra note 1 for citations and subsequent history
treatment.
188. 47 Cal. 3d 983, 766 P.2d 1, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1989).
189. Id. at 1036, 766 P.2d at 33, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1038, 766 P.2d at 35, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
192. Id. at 1040-41, 766 P.2d at 37, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
193. 48 Cal. 3d 843, 771 P.2d 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989).
194. Id. at 870, 771 P.2d at 1288, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
195. Id.. at 871, 771 P.2d at 1289, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
196., Id.
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In response, the supreme court first concluded that it is not errone-
ous per se to reiterate to the jury the language used in the instruc-
tion, but that the entire record must be reviewed to determine if the
remarks were prejudicial.197 The court then concluded that any con-
fusion which may have occurred was alleviated through other argu-
ments or jury instructions.1 98 The court explained that when the
jurors were instructed to follow the law, they were simply being told
to put aside any pre-existing biases against the death penalty.199
G. Factor (k)
When considering evidence in mitigation, section 190.3(k) of the
Penal Code instructs the jury to assess "[a]ny other circumstance
which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a
legal excuse for the crime. '200 In People v. Easley,201 the California
Supreme Court held that because this section limited the trier of fact
to circumstances of the crime and did not consider other mitigating
circumstances generally associated with the defendant, it was uncon-
stitutional under -Eddings v. Oklahoma 202 and Lockett v. Ohio.203 In
response to Easley, courts now instruct the jury to consider both the
defendant's background and character in mitigation. 20 4
None of the cases in the survey upheld an assertion of error due to
factor (k), even though almost half of them claimed such error on ap-
peal.205 For example, although the trial court in People v. Johnson 206
did not specifically use the modified instruction based on Easley, the
instruction it did give was even more favorable to the defendant.207
The language of CALJIC 8.84.1 restricts the analysis to "any other
aspect of [the] defendant's character or record,"208 but the lower
court in Johnson expanded the instruction to include "any other cir-
197. Id. at 870, 771 P.2d at 1288, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
198. Id. at 873, 771 P.2d at 1290, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
199. Id. at 871, 771 P.2d at 1289, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
200. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) (West 1988). See generally Death Penalty Law ,
supra note 2, at 459-62; Death Penalty Law II, supra note 43, at 1174-76.
201. 34 Cal. 3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983).
202. 455 U.S. 104, 110-16 (1982); see supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
203. 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
204. See CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (West Supp. 1987).
205. The following cases claimed error due to factor (k) on appeal: Allison, Bloom,
Bonin, Burton, Coleman, Hamilton, Johnson, Morales, and Murtishaw. See supra note
1 for citations and subsequent history treatment.
206. 47 Cal. 3d 1194, 767 P.2d 1047, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1989).
207. Id. at 1248, 767 P.2d at 1075, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
208. CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (West Supp. 1987).
cumstances relating to the case or to a defendant as reasons for not
imposing a death sentence."209 Because the instruction necessarily
encompassed CALJIC 8.84.1, no prejudicial error could occur.2 10
The court also rejected the contention that factor (k) and factor (1),
which concern instructions to consider character and background evi-
dence not necessarily associated with the crime, 21 1 must be read in
"conjunction" with one another. In People v. Burton,212 the judge
sent a separate clarifying instruction to the jury in response to its re-
quest for an interpretation of factor (k), but he did not reiterate his
earlier instructions including factor (1). The defense argued that this
sequence of events placed an inordinate emphasis on the language in
factor (k) without the additional clarification mandated by Easley,
but the court rejected the argument, finding that the trial court had
no duty beyond directly responding to the jury's question. 213
VI. CONCLUSION
During the first six months of 1989, the California Supreme Court
continued its trend during the "post-Bird" era of carefully analyzing
the errors claimed on appeal and reversing the penalty only when an
error results in actual prejudice. Implicit in this trend is the realistic
understanding that while a multitude of errors will always occur in
the dynamic environment of the courtroom, few have any real effect
on the outcome.214
Of the twenty-one cases surveyed, eighty-six percent affirmed the
conviction of guilt.215 This supports the long-term trend of the Lucas
Court, which has upheld the first-degree murder conviction in
ninety-five percent of the death penalty appeals over the last two
years.2 1 6 However, even when guilt was affirmed, the death penalty
was reversed in twenty-nine percent of the cases, 217 matching the
two-year trend exactly.218 Of course, the record of the Lucas Court
stands in sharp contrast to the Bird Court, which affirmed the con-
viction of guilt in only sixty-six percent of the cases, and reversed the
death penalty in eighty-seven percent of its cases.2 19
During the past two years, the Lucas Court has attempted to re-
209. -Johnson, 47 Cal. 3d at 1248, 767 P.2d at 1075, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
210. Id.
211. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(1) (West 1988).
212. 48 Cal. 3d 843, 771 P.2d 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1989).
213. Id. at 866, 771 P.2d at 1285, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
214. For a discussion of the court's perspective on "harmless error," see Death Pen-
alty Law I, supra note 2, at 451-52.
215. See supra note 27.
216. Uelmen, Mainstream Justice, CAL. LAW., July 1989, at 40.
217. See supra note 27.
218. Uelmen, supra note 216, at 39.
219. Id.
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duce the burgeoning backlog of death penalty appeals by devoting al-
most forty percent of its published opinions to this one subject
alone.220 Nevertheless, even though the court managed to decide sev-
enty-three death penalty cases during its second year, seventy-three
new cases have since replaced those, leaving a pending backlog of ap-
proximately 171 cases. 221
'Although changes in the habeas corpus procedure are a step in the
right direction, 222 greater efforts at dramatic reform by both the leg-
islature and the judiciary must be made to prevent an intolerable
breakdown of the criminal justice system while the courts struggle
with an overload of capital punishment cases. Anything less is a se-
vere and unnecessary compromise between the demands of the state
in executing its judgments without undue delay, and the rights of the
death row inmate to a meticulous and careful appeal.
JAMES DUFF MCGINLEY
V. INSURANCE LAW
The Proposition 103 insurance initiative is facially
constitutional in principal part: Insurance Code sections
1861.01(b), which temporarily denied rate increases to all
insurers not facing insolvency, and 1861.10(c), which
named a private corporation to protect policyholders'
interests, were declared unconstitutional but severable
from the remainder of the initiative: Calfarm Insurance
Company v. Deukmejian.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Calfarm Insurance Company v. Deukmejian,1 the California
Supreme Court assumed original jurisdiction to hear a petition for
writ of mandate seeking to have the Proposition 103 insurance rate
reduction and control initiative declared facially unconstitutional.
The court found two provisions of the initiative to be invalid. First,
section 1861.01(b) of the Insurance Code,2 which for one year would
have allowed rate increases only to insurers facing insolvency, denied
220. Id. at 38.
221. Id.
222. See supra notes 6-22 and accompanying text.
1. 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989). Justice Broussard
wrote the opinion of the unanimous court.
2. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (West Supp. 1989).
constitutional due process by permitting the imposition of confisca-
tory rates on financially healthy insurers.3 Second, section 1861.10(c)
of the Insurance Code,4 which identified a private consumer advocacy
corporation to represent the interests of policyholders, violated the
state constitution's prohibition 5 against initiatives naming a private
corporation to have any power or duty.6 Both of these provisions
were held to be severable from the remainder of the initiative. 7 The
court did not decide the constitutionality of section 12202.1 of the
Revenue and Taxation Code,8 which provides for increased tax rates
on insurers, because no additional taxes had been collected.9 How-
ever, the court indicated that this section would be severable if subse-
quently found to be enforced unconstitutionally.1 0 The court
determined that the remaining sections of the initiative were facially
constitutional." Finally, the court held all valid provisions of Pro-
position 103 to be generally related to the goal of insurance cost regu-
lation, thus satisfying12  California's single-subject initiative
requirement.13
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Pursuant to the California initiative process,14 Proposition 103 ap-
peared on the General Election ballot in November 1988.15 The initi-
ative declared that "[e]normous increases in the cost of insurance
ha[d] made it both unaffordable and unavailable to millions of
Californians."16 Proposition 103 promised to "protect consumers
from arbitrary insurance rates and practices, to encourage a competi-
3. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 815, 771 P.2d at 1251, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
4. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10(c) (West Supp. 1989).
5. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 12.
6. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 815, 771 P.2d at 1251, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
7. Id.
8. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 12202.1 (West Supp. 1989).
9. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 815, 771 P.2d at 1251-52, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 165-66.
10. Id. at 815, 771 P.2d at 1252, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
11. Id. at 842, 771 P.2d at 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
12. Id. at 816, 771 P.2d at 1252, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 166.
13. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
14. See id.; see also 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum §§ 1-34 (1977 &
Supp. 1989); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 120-
125 (9th ed. 1989). See generally Comment, New Limits on the California Initiative:
An Analysis and Critique, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 1045 (1986).
15. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 812, 771 P.2d at 1249, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 163; CAL. GEN.
ELECTION BALLOT PAMPHLET (Nov. 8, 1988). The ballot included five different initia-
tives related to the insurance industry: Proposition 100, 101, 103, 104 and 106. A Cali-
fornia Journal Analysis: November 1988 Ballot Propositions, "19 CAL.' J., Oct. 1988, at
13-16. This spate of initiatives was prompted by a common perception that insurance
rates in California were unfair; one poll found that 94% of voters felt their rates were
too high. Id. at 13. California constitutes 15 percent of the national insurance market,
and its automobile insurance premiums alone total $12 billion annually. Id.
16. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 812-13, 771 P.2d at 1249-50, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64.
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tive insurance marketplace, to provide for an acceptable Insurance
Commissioner, and to ensure that insurance is fair, available, and af-
fordable for all Californians.' 1 7
The initiative proposed that insurers reduce premiums on new or
renewed policies to at least twenty percent less than rates in effect
on November 8, 1987.18 Proposition 103 also prohibited rate increases
for one year after its approval, unless an insurer could demonstrate
that it was "substantially threatened with insolvency."'19 Any in-
crease after November 8, 1989, would require the approval of the in-
surance commissioner, following public notice and a hearing if
requested by a consumer. 20 In addition, a "Good Driver Discount"
would be mandated for all qualified drivers.2 1
Insurers would lose their exemption from California civil rights,
antitrust, and unfair business practice statutes.22 Car insurance poli-
cies could be cancelled or not renewed only in specific circum-
stances.2 3 However, insurers would retain the right to stop doing
business in the state.24 The state's insurance commissioner would
change from an appointed to an elected official. 25 The proposition
also provided for an "independent, non-profit corporation" to protect
consumers' interests, and required insurers to give notice of this cor-
poration to their customers.26 This organization would be formed by
the insurance commissioner, with a board to be elected from its pub-
lic membership.27
To maintain state tax revenues, the gross premium tax rate
17. Prop. 103 § 2 (1988). The initiative covers all risk and operations insurance,
excluding life, title, some kinds of marine, disability, workers' compensation, mortgage,
county mutual fire, and reinsurance. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 812 n.1, 771 P.2d at 1249
n.1, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 163 n.1.
18. Calfarn, 48 Cal. 3d at 813, 771 P.2d at 1250, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
19. Id. (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(b) (West Supp. 1989)).
20. Id. at 813, 824, 771 P.2d at 1250, 1257-58, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 164, 171-72. Future
rates would be determined primarily by the insured's driving record, miles driven an-
nually, and years of driving experience. Id. at 813 n.4, 771 P.2d at 1250 n.4, 258 Cal.
Rptr. at 164 n.4. Additional criteria would be developed subsequently by the commis-
sioner. Id.
21. Id. "Good drivers" would receive an additional 20% reduction in rates. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see infra note 68 and accompanying text.
24. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 831, 771 P.2d at 1262-63, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77. If this
caused a substantial reduction in the availability of insurance, the commissioner could
create a "joint underwriting authority" to prevent a market shortage. Id. at 831, 771
P.2d at 1262, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
25. CAL., INS. CODE § 12900(a) (West Supp. 1989).
26. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 831, 771 P.2d at 1263, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
27. Id.
charged to insurers would be adjusted to compensate for any reduc-
tion in premiums collected.28 The initiative would also repeal ex-
isting statutes that banned discounts or rebates on premiums, and
prohibited banks from engaging in the insurance business.29 Finally,
Proposition 103 stated that it should be liberally construed, and that
any invalid provisions would be severable and would "not affect
other provisions or applications of the act which can be given
effect."30
On November 8, 1988, Proposition 103 was approved by the vot-
ers.31 Several insurance companies immediately filed an original pe-
tition for writ of mandate with the state supreme court, seeking to
have the initiative declared unconstitutional on its face.32 On No-
vember 10, 1988, the court temporarily stayed the entire initiative.33
One month later, on December 7, the supreme court assumed origi-
nal jurisdiction while partially vacating its previous stay.34 In the en-
suing litigation, the initiative was attacked on six grounds: (1) the
rate reductions were "arbitrary, discriminatory, and confiscatory,"
and thus contradicted both federal and state due process require-
ments; (2) the restrictions on cancellation and nonrenewal of policies
violated insurers' existing contract rights; (3) the formation of a con-
sumer advocacy corporation violated California's constitutional prohi-
bition against naming a private corporation to perform any function;
(4) the gross premium tax rate could not be changed by an initiative
or, alternatively, such changes required approval by two-thirds of the
voters, and the initiative impermissibly delegated legislative power to
the commissioner; (5) the initiative addressed more than one topic,
and therefore was invalid because it violated the state constitution's
"single-subject" rule; and (6) the invalid provisions of Proposition 103
could not be severed, and thus rendered the entire act invalid.35
28. Id. at 813, 771 P.2d at 1250, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
29. Prop. 103 § 7.
30. Id. § 8.
31. Dresslar & Carrizosa, Insurers Launch Attack on Proposition 103, L.A. Daily
J., Nov. 10, 1988, at 1, col. 6. The initiative passed with 51.1% of the votes cast. Id.
32. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 812, 771 P.2d at 1249, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 163. The petition-
ers included seven insurance companies and the Association of California Insurance
Companies. Id. California's Governor, Attorney General, Insurance Commissioner,
and Board of Equalization were named as respondents. Id. Supporters, including the
Access to Justice Foundation, appeared with the respondents as real parties in interest.
Id.
33. Id. at 814, 771 P.2d at 1250, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
34. Id. The stay remained in effect for provisions covering the rate rollback, the
insolvency requirement for relief, and the consumer advocacy corporation. Id.
35. Id. at 814, 771 P.2d at 1250-51, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 164-65.
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III. THE COURT'S OPINION
A. The Insolvency Requirement for First-Year Rate Relief Was
Unconstitutional But Severable
Section 1861.01 of the Insurance Code mandated a minimum
twenty percent rollback in rates from those in effect on November 8,
1987.36 It further provided that for one year after November 8, 1988,
no insurance rate could be increased unless the insurance commis-
sioner determined the insurer was "substantially threatened with in-
solvency. '37 The petitioners argued that this section was a denial of
their due process rights under the constitutions of the United States
and California.38 Their claim had three elements: (1) the initial
rollback was "arbitrary, discriminatory and confiscatory"; (2) no ef-
fective administrative mechanism existed for gaining timely relief
from confiscatory rates; and (3) the insolvency requirement did not
allow appropriate relief from confiscatory rates during the year fol-
lowing the initiative's approval. 39
Initially, the court held insurance rate regulation to be a valid ex-
ercise of state police powers.4 0 Such controls are constitutional if
"reasonably calculated" to reduce the public's cost while allowing "a
just and reasonable return" for the industry being regulated.41 In ad-
dressing the rate rollback, the court stated that the petitioners' bur-
den was to prove that the law was "so restrictive as to facially
preclude any possibility of a just and reasonable return."42 In other
words, the constitutionality of price controls will be determined by
36. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.01(a) (West Supp. 1989).
37. Id. § 1861.01(b).
38. See U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. Due process considera-
tions have long been used to assure reasonable rates of return for regulated businesses.
See, e.g., Chicago, M. & St. P.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890) (Minnesota stat-
ute barring judicial review of unreasonable state-determined railroad rates declared
unconstitutional; unreasonable rates violate due process guarantees).
39. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 814, 771 P.2d at 1250, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
40. Id. at 816, 771 P.2d at 1252, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 166; see also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Con-
stitutional Law § 437 (1979 & Supp. 1989); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law §§ 141-
154 (1989); 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Companies § 10 (1977 & Supp. 1989); 8 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 87-88 (9th ed. 1989).
See generally 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 283, 432-443 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
41. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 816, 771 P.2d at 1252, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (quoting
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 165, 550 P.2d 1001, 1027, 130 Cal. Rptr.
465, 491 (1976)); see Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1988); Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
42. Cafarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 816, 771 P.2d at 1152, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (quoting Hut-
ton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 571, 350 A.2d 1, 16 (1975)).
their results rather than their language unless a nonconfiscatory ap-
plication of the statute is impossible.
This focus on results requires an examination, not of the rates set
by the initiative, but of its provisions for insurer relief if those rates
are confiscatory. With the exception of the first-year insolvency re-
quirement,4 3 the court found adequate relief for potential insurer
claimants in section 1861.05 of the Insurance Code,44 which prohibits
any rate "which is excessive, inadequate, [or] unfairly discrimina-
tory."45 The court interpreted this section to require rates that
would allow insurers a fair rate of return.46 Because a rate cannot be
both fair and confiscatory,47 and because the initiative -requires relief
from confiscatory rates, the initial rollback was not facially
unconstitutional. 48
The petitioners then argued that the mechanism for obtaining re-
lief was inadequate, and would require them to endure confiscatory
rates pending the commissioner's determination of appropriate
rates.49 The insurers asserted that the review process would be un-
manageably cumbersome, and therefore could not achieve the initia-
tive's goal of reduced insurance rates.50 However, the court found
nothing on Proposition 103's face that would prevent efficient
processing of insurers' rate applications. 51 Other than the initiative's
notice and public hearing requirements, the insurance commissioner
has "broad discretion to adopt rules and regulations as necessary to
promote the public welfare." 52 The commissioner can delegate hear-
ings,53 consolidate cases, and take any reasonable measures to admin-
ister the law effectively.5 4 "It 'is to be presumed that the
[administrative agency] will exercise its power in conformity with the
43. See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
44. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West Supp. 1989).
45. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 817, 771 P.2d at 1253, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (emphasis
added) (quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West Supp. 1989)). The same section also
directs the commissioner to "consider whether the rate mathematically reflects the in-
surance company's investment income," although it gives no guidelines for determin-
ing how much income is proper. Id. at 822, 771. P.2d at 1256, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 170
(quoting CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.05(a) (West Supp. 1989)).
46. Id. at 822-23, 771 P.2d at 1256-57, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 170-71.
47. Id. at 816 n.5, 771 P.2d at 1252 n.5, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 166 n.5; see also FPC v.
Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 392 (1974) (noting that "fair and reasonable" and "confisca-
tory" are opposites; a rate is either one or the other).
48. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 825-26, 771 P.2d at 1259, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
49. Id. at 823, 771 P.2d at 1257, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
50. Id. (quoting Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 17 Cal. 3d 129, 173, 550 P.2d 1001,
1033, 130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 497 (1976) (unworkable rent control ordinance with burden-
some requirements declared invalid)).
51. Id. at 824, 771 P.2d at 1257-58, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 171-72.
52.. Id. (citing Credit Ins. Gen. Agents Ass'n v. Payne, 16 Cal. 3d 651, 656, 547 P.2d
993, 996, 128 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1976)).
53. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.08 (West Supp. 1989).
54. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 824, 771 P.2d at 1258, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
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requirements of the Constitution; and if it does act unfairly, the fault
lies with the [agency] and not the statute.' "55 Therefore, because the
adequacy of the rate relief process will depend upon the performance
of the agency rather than the language of the initiative, the court
found that this section of the proposition was valid on its face.
5 6
Furthermore, the court inferred from the language of Proposition
103 that the commissioner has the power to authorize interim rates
for insurers during the administrative review process.5 7 If the com-
missioner's final rate is less than the interim amount charged by in-
surers, the insurers will have to refund the excess, plus interest, to
their customers.58 When the court combined this interim rate
scheme with the fair rate of return and administrative review provi-
sions, the entire rate rollback section, with the exception of the first-
year insolvency clause, was held to be facially constitutional.59
The court's determination that section 1861.05 of the Insurance
Code requires a fair rate of return for insurers could not be recon-
ciled with a section that limited first-year adjustments.6 0 Section
1861.01(b) of the Insurance Code allowed relief from rate rollbacks
between November 8, 1988, and November 8, 1989, only for insurers
"substantially threatened with insolvency."61 Accordingly, finan-
cially sound insurers could have been subject to confiscatory rates
during that period. Because this would have denied their due process
rights, the court declared the insolvency restriction on first year re-
lief from unfair rates to be unconstitutional.
6 2
55. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fisher v. City of Berke-
ley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 684, 693 P.2d 261, 293, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682, 714 (1984)).
56. Id. at 825-26, 771 P.2d at 1259, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
57. Id. at 824-25, 771 P.2d at 1258, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 172. The court analogized this
to the Public Utilities Commission's well-recognized implied power to authorize in-
terim rates. See, e.g., Dyke Water Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 56 Cal. 2d 105, 110, 363
P.2d 326, 328, 14 Cal. Rptr. 310, 312, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
58. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 825, 771 P.2d at 1258, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
59. Id. at 825-26, 771 P.2d at 1259, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
60. Id. at 817-18, 771 P.2d at 1253, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
61. Id. at 818, 771 P.2d at 1253, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 167 (quoting CAL. INS. CODE
§ 1861.01(b) (West Supp. 1989)).
62. Id. at 821, 771 P.2d at 1255-56, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 169-70. The court rejected the
respondent's arguments that, under the circumstances, the insurers could be forced to
operate at a loss for one year. First, the respondents noted that price freezes are not
uncommon when administrative procedures are being developed. Id. at 819, 771 P.2d at
1254, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 168; see, e.g., Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631
(1978); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). However, the court distinguished those cases allowing
price freezes from the present case, because the rates frozen in these cases had been
originally set by the businesses themselves, thus creating a presumption of fairness.
The petitioners insisted that this element of the initiative was not
severable and, therefore, its unconstitutionality should invalidate the
entire proposition.63 The court stated first that a severability clause
of the type in Proposition 103,64 while not conclusive, "normally calls
for sustaining the valid part of the enactment."65 It then tested the
invalid clause for grammatical, functional, and volitional separability
and concluded that it was properly severable from the rest of the
initiative.66
In sum, the rate rollback provision allowed a fair rate of return for
all insurers, contained a facially valid process for gaining approval of
fair rates, and gave the commissioner the power to authorize interim
rates pending final administrative determinations. The insolvency
restriction on first year rate relief was unconstitutional but severable,
leaving the balance of the section valid.
B. The Restrictions on Cancellation and Nonrenewal Apply to All
Policies in Effect When the Initiative Became Law
Section 1861.03(c) of the Insurance Code67 permits insurers to can-
Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 819-20, 771 P.2d at 1254-55, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 168-69. In Cafarm,
because the prices to be frozen would have been substantially less than existing rates,
they were more likely to be unfair. Id. at 820, 771 P.2d at 1155, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
The respondents' second claim was that high insurance rates had created an emer-
gency that justified a temporary rate freeze. Id. The court recognized that such meas-
ures are occasionally appropriate, particularly during wartime. Id.; see, e.g., Bowles v.
Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) (World War II rent control); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135 (1921) (post-World War I rent control); Whitney v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 963 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986) (Medicare rate freeze under Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984). However, the court distinguished these acute temporary emergencies
from the protracted insurance rate problem by observing that, unlike the wartime
cases, insurance rates do not create an expectation that everyone will sacrifice to over-
come the emergency. Caifarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 820-21, 771 P.2d at 1155, 258 Cal. Rptr. at
169.
63. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 814, 771 P.2d at 1251, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 165.
64. Prop. 103 § 8(c) provides:
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circum-
stances is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or ap-
plications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable.
Id.
65. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 821, 771 P.2d at 1256, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 170 (quoting
Santa Barbara School Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 331, 530 P.2d 605, 618, 118
Cal. Rptr. 637, 650 (1975)); see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 32 Cal. 3d 180,
190, 649 P.2d 902, 908, 185 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266 (1982); see also 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes
§§ 14-15 (1980).
66. CaUfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 822, 771 P.2d at 1256, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 170. The court
noted that the insolvency provision was grammatically severable because, as a separate
subsection, it could be removed without affecting the remainder of the initiative; it was
functionally severable as an exception to the fair return rule because its deletion
would simply allow the general rule to apply; and it was volitionally severable because
the court felt voters would have supported the initiative had it not contained the
clause. Id.
67. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(c) (West Supp. 1989).
[Vol. 17: 523, 1990] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
cel or refuse to renew automobile policies only in the event of " 'non-
payment of premiums ... fraud or material misrepresentation ...
[or] a substantial increase in the hazard insured against.' "68 The re-
spondents and petitioners both agreed that this section applies to pol-
icies extant when the initiative was approved. 69 Although the
petitioners did not question the section's prospective effect on new
policies, they did challenge the retrospective application as an uncon-
stitutional impairment of existing contract rights.
7 0
The court agreed that the restrictions applied to existing policies.7 1
Otherwise, insurers might defeat the initiative's purpose through
widespread cancellations or nonrenewals.72 While acknowledging
that the law affected existing contract rights, the court emphasized
that the state's police power to protect its citizens sometimes justifies
interference with such rights.73 Furthermore, the highly regulated
insurance industry was "on notice" that its rates might be legis-
lated.74 Here, the "relatively low degree" of interference with insur-
ers' contract disputes was outweighed by the high public interest in
lower insurance rates and by a desire to avoid mass policy cancella-
tions and nonrenewals resulting from passage of the initiative.75 Af-
ter noting that insurers retain the right to withdraw from doing
business in California, the court validated the retrospective applica-
tion of the cancellation and nonrenewal section.76
68. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 826, 771 P.2d at 1259, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 173 (quoting CAL.
INS. CODE § 1861.03(c) (West Supp. 1989)).
69. Id.
70. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 10; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also 39 CAL. JUR. 3D
Insurance Contracts and Coverage § 6 (1977 & Supp. 1989). See generally 16A C.J.S.
Constitutional Law §§ 283, 356, 362 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
71. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 827, 771 P.2d at 1260, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 828-30, 771 P.2d at 1260-62, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 174-76; see also Exxon Corp.
v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983) (state law banning oil and gas price increases negated
clauses in existing contracts that permitted such increases); Energy Reserves Group,
Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983) (state law controlling gas prices
barred price increases allowed by existing contracts); Hinckley v. Bechtel Corp., 41
Cal. App. 3d 206, 215, 116 Cal. Rptr. 33, 39 (1974) (noting that "the police power of the
state to regulate insurance business cannot be contracted away ... [a state may exer-
cise this power] notwithstanding interference with existing contracts").
74. Catfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 829-30, 771 P.2d at 1261-62, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 175-76
(quoting American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins., 374 Mass. 181, 194, 372
N.E.2d 520, 528 (1978)).
75. Id. at 831, 771 P.2d at 1262-63, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
76. Id. at 831, 771 P.2d at 1263, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
C. The Formation of a Private Consumer Advocacy Corporation
Was Unconstitutional But Severable
Section 1861.10(c) of the Insurance Code directed the establishment
of a nonprofit corporation to protect the interests of insurance con-
sumers. 77 In attacking this section, the petitioners cited article II,
section 12, of the California Constitution: "'no statute ... [or] initia-
tive, that names ... or identifies any private corporation to perform
any function . . .may be submitted to the electors or have any ef-
fect.' "78 The respondents argued that the constitutional restriction
should: (1) apply only to existing rather than future corporations; (2)
exempt nonprofit public benefit corporations, such as the proposed
consumer advocacy organization; and (3) apply only if the corpora-
tion's function is equivalent to that of a public office. 79
The court explained that article II's purpose is to avoid giving "spe-
cial privilege[s]" to an initiative's sponsor.8 0 Moreover, the court
stated that if future corporations were allowed to be named, they
could improperly benefit in the same way as existing corporations.8 1
Even nonprofit status fails to provide an exemption from article II.
In fact, in 1964, the legislature rejected an amendment that would
have excluded nonprofit corporations from the restriction.8 2 The
court also refused to find that the initiative created a public corpora-
tion; although established by the insurance commissioner, the organi-
zation would be a private corporation operated by consumers elected
from its membership.83 Finally, the court rejected the argument that
article II applied only to functions of the type performed by public
offices.84 Not only does article II contain no such restrictions, but the
court concluded that the corporation would have performed a quasi-
public function by representing all insurance consumers at the com-
missioner's hearings.85 Therefore, because section 1861.10(c) named a
private corporation to perform such a function, the supreme court de-
clared it unconstitutional.86
The petitioners claimed that, based on the constitution's language,
the consumer advocacy section of the initiative was not severable and
77. CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.10(c) (West Supp. 1989).
78. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 832, 771 P.2d at 1263, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 177 (quoting CAL.
CONST. art. II, § 12); see also 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum § 2 (1977 &
Supp. 1989).
79. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 832-35, 771 P.2d at 1263-65, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 177-79.
80. Id. at 833, 771 P.2d at 1264, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 833-34, 771 P.2d at 1264, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
83. Id. at 834, 771 P.2d at 1264-65, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79.
84. Id. at 834-35, 771 P.2d at 1265, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
85. Id. at 835, 771 P.2d at 1265, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 179.
86. Id.
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the entire proposition should have been invalidated.8 7 Section 12 of
Article II states that "no statute proposed to the electors .... by initia-
tive . . . [shall] have any effect" if it names a private corporation to
perform a function or duty.88 The petitioners argued that the words
"no statute" encompassed the entire initiative and precluded sever-
ance.8 9 The court disagreed with this reading of the constitution. It
pointed out that initiatives often include more than one statute, as
demonstrated by Proposition 103 itself. Because the constitution
specifies "no statute" rather than "no initiative," the court held that
an invalid statute can be severed from an otherwise valid initiative.9 0
The court then applied the three-prong separability test 91 and found
the private corporation provision of the initiative severable.92
D. The Validity of Premium Tax Rate Adjustments Could Not Be
Determined
Section 12202.1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code authorizes the
Board of Equalization to adjust the rate of premium taxes paid by in-
surers.93 This provision is intended to compensate for any reduction
in premiums collected by insurers, thereby maintaining state tax rev-
enues.94 The petitioners insisted that the rate adjustment was invalid
because the state constitution either barred tax change by initiative,
or required a two-thirds vote by the electorate to enact such a
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. II, § 12).
89. Id. The petitioners analogized this to the California Constitution's "single-sub-
ject" rule, which forbids severance of invalid statutes. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. This
rule is intended to prevent initiatives from addressing more than one issue. Calfarm,
48 Cal. 3d at 835, 771 P.2d at 1265, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 179. However, the single-subject
rule states that an initiative measure that violates the rule is invalid; section 12 speci-
fies that an improper statute is invalid. Id. at 835, 771 P.2d at 1265-66, 258 Cal. Rptr. at
179-80. By examining the purpose of the two constitutional sections, the court was
able to distinguish them. Id. Section 8 prevents two otherwise valid statutes from ad-
dressing different subjects in the same initiative; because a court would not know
which statute to sever, the entire initiative must be invalidated. Id. at 836, 771 P.2d at
1266, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 180. On the other hand, section 12 seeks to prevent the assign-
ment of duties to private corporations, thus allowing the court to excise the invalid
statute and leave the balance of the initiative intact. Id.
90. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 836, 771 P.2d at 1266, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
91. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
92. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 836, 771 P.2d at 1266, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
93. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 12202.1 (West Supp. 1989). This tax is imposed by
the state constitution. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 28; see 71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local
Taxation §§ 428-434 (1973 & Supp. 1989); 9 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Taxation § 293 (9th ed. 1989).
94. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 837, 771 P.2d at 1266-67, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
change.95 They further claimed this provision improperly delegated
legislative power to the Board of Equalization.96
However, the court elected not to rule on the petitioners' conten-
tions, pointing out that article XIII, section 32, of the state constitu-
tion97 prohibits review of tax measures before any payments have
been made. 98 The court asserted that a prepayment review in this
case would have been difficult because the adjustment had not yet
been made, and might never be made pursuant to the initiatige. 99 As
a result, the court declined to decide the validity of the tax provision.
Although the court did not settle the tax issue, it did resolve the
potential question of severance. Based on the three-prong test for
severability,100 the provision was declared to be severable if subse-
quently found to be invalid.1 01
E. Proposition 103 Did Not Violate the Single-Subject Rule
The California Constitution requires initiatives to embrace only a
single subject; any initiative addressing "'more than one subject may
not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.' "102 It was ar-
gued that provisions that repealed laws barring customer rebates and
the sale of insurance by banks were not related to the goal of reduc-
ing insurance costs, and thus violated the single-subject rule.103 Had
this argument succeeded, the entire initiative would have been
invalidated.
The court rejected this theory, finding all the elements of the initi-
ative to be "reasonably germane" to the goal of reducing insurance
costs. 104 It was not necessary for the court to determine whether all
the provisions would actually achieve their intended purposes; be-
cause they arguably advanced the initiative's goals, the single-subject
95. Id. at 837, 771 P.2d at 1267, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 181; see CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 28;
CAL. CONST. art XIII A, § 3.
96. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 837, 771 P.2d at 1267, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
97. "No legal or equitable process shall issue in any proceeding in any court
against this State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax.
After payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover
the tax paid .. " CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 32.
98. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 839-40, 771 P.2d at 1268, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
99. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
100. See id.
101. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 840-41, 771 P.2d at 1269-70, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84.
102. Id. at 841, 771 P.2d at 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 184 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 8); see also 42 AM. JUR. 2D Initiative and Referendum §§ 1-20 (1969 & Supp. 1989); 38
CAL. JUR. 3D Initiative and Referendum § 19 (1977 & Supp. 1989).
103. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 841-42, 771 P.2d at 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 184. The Asso-
ciation of California Life Insurance Companies, an intervenor in the action, predicted
that the repeal of these laws would actually cause an increase in rates, thus contra-
dicting the initiative's stated goal of cost control. Id. at 841, 771 P.2d at 1270, 258 Cal.
Rptr. at 184.
104. Id. at 841-42, 771 P.2d at 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
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rule was satisfied.105
In summary, the court determined that two provisions of the initia-
tive were unconstitutional but severable. The court also concluded
that the insolvency prerequisite of section 1861.01(b) of the Insurance
Code for first year rate relief violated both federal and state due pro-
cess rights. The court found that section 1861.10(c) violated the state
constitution's restriction against initiatives naming a private corpora-
tion to perform any function. The validity of section 12202.1 of the
Revenue and Taxation Code was not decided, but the court held that
it would be severable if subsequently declared invalid. Accordingly, a
writ of mandate was issued to prohibit enforcement of the insolvency
and consumer advocacy corporation sections. Finally, the supreme
court declared that all other provisions of Proposition 103 were
facially constitutional.106
IV. IMPACT
In finding that Proposition 103's language implied a fair rate of re-
turn for insurers, the court clearly altered the initiative in order to
save it. However, it is unclear whether a widespread reduction in in-
surance rates will follow.
The post-Calfarm initiative places an enormous burden on the in-
surance commissioner, who must define the "fair rate of return" for
each of the state's insurers. Before reaching this question, the com-
missioner will have to develop accurate means for measuring insur-
ers' costs, as well as proper standards for setting individual
consumers' premiums. Nearly one year after the initiative's adop-
tion, the commissioner had yet to announce any standards to define a
"fair rate of return" or to conduct any public hearings to consider ap-
plications for rate increases.'0 7 The rollbacks mandated by Proposi-
tion 103 were nowhere to be seen.
In the meantime, many insurers have raised premiums substan-
tially,108 while flooding the commissioner's office with requests for
rate relief in the event that rollbacks or restrictions are eventually
105. Id. at 842, 771 P.2d at 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
106. Id.
107. See Dresslar, Lead Plaintiff Seeks Stay in Prop. 103 Fffective Date, L.A. Daily
J., Oct. 2, 1989, at 4, col. 2 [hereinafter Dresslar, Lead Plaintiff Seeks Stay]; Dresslar,
Gillespie Trumpets Insurance Companies' Message, L.A. Daily J., Aug. 4, 1989, at 3,
col. 2.
108. During the period when Calfarm was being decided by the court, many insur-
ers boosted rates by 24 to 46 percent. Dresslar, 103 Advocates Ask Court to Freeze In-
surance Hikes, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 21, 1989, at 3, col. 2.
imposed.109 Petition drives and litigation continue, 110 with no evi-
dence of progress toward a resolution of the problems spawning the
initiative."'
It is unlikely that Proposition 103 will ever be enforced in the man-
ner anticipated by the voters in 1988. Simply trying to define the
court's "fair rate of return" standard could generate enough litigation
to postpone rate cuts indefinitely. The initiative's most substantial
effect may be as a signal to the legislature. The same voters who
placed five insurance initiatives on the 1988 ballot and adopted Prop-
osition 103 are now paying higher insurance rates. Legislators who
face these frustrated voters may be inspired to enact statutes that
will both reduce premiums and survive attacks by insurers."12
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's flexible interpretation of Proposi-
tion 103 saved it from constitutional invalidity. However, the
probability of endless litigation makes it doubtful that the initiative
will lead to widespread reductions in insurance rates. If the current
insurance crisis is to be resolved, it most likely will be through care-
fully drafted legislation. The voters have spoken; it remains to be
seen whether the legislature will respond.
ROBERT J. MILLS
109. By July 1989, the commissioner's office had received approximately 4000 appli-
cations for rate relief. Bush, Gillespie Urged to Cut Insurance Rates Immediately, L.A.
Daily J., July 28, 1989, at 3, col. 2.
110. Id.; Dresslar, Lead Plaintiff Seeks Stay, supra note 107. For example, at the
same time that the Proposition 103 sponsors were suing Insurance Commissioner Rox-
ani Gillespie for failing to implement the initiative, the Calfarm Insurance Company
was asking a court to stay the November 1989 effective date for some of the rate con-
trol provisions. Id.
111. Depending on who is being asked, the causes of high insurance rates may in-
clude: greedy insurers, or equally greedy plaintiffs' lawyers; a lack of insurance regula-
tion, or a need for tort reform; and other factors including fraud, auto theft, and the
absence of no-fault insurance. See Kushman, The Insurance-Reform Stampede, 19
CAL. J., Oct. 1988, at 417; Schubert, While Roxani Gillespie Is Placed on the Horns of a
Dilemma, L.A. Daily J., May 31, 1989, at 6, col. 3.
112. Much of the foreseeable Proposition 103 litigation will be the result of its
vagueness, particularly regarding the commissioner's duties and the court-created "fair
rate of return" standard. The legislature's resources would allow extensive fact find-
ing before a bill became law; this should result in more effective and less vulnerable
insurance rate controls.
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VI. TORT LAW
A. In a defamation action, no statutory or common law
privilege extends beyond the constitutional requirements
protecting the media in reporting on matters of "public
interest"; therefore, a private figure need prove only
negligence on behalf of a media defendant to prevail in a
libel or slander action: Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co.1 arose from a consumer affairs re-
port by KCRA-TV in Sacramento, a television station owned by
Kelly Broadcasting Company. In the report, the television station ac-
cused the plaintiff's contracting company of performing shoddy home
repair work. According to the broadcast, Brown had refused to com-
ment to the television station.2 After the report aired, Brown denied
the truth of the report and made a written demand for a retraction.
When the station refused, Brown brought an action alleging slander
per se, negligence, and malice.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, finding that the defendant's broadcast fell under a conditional
privilege found in the California Civil Code.3 The court of appeal re-
versed,4 although it agreed that the conditional privilege applied to
the defendant. The court of appeal found, however, that there was a
triable issue of material fact on whether there was malice5 on the
1. 48 Cal. 3d 711, 771 P.2d 406, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1989). Justice Eagleson au-
thored the opinion of a unanimous court. The Honorable Campbell M. Lu~as, Presid-
ing Justice, Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, sat by
designation.
2. Id. at 719-20, 771 P.2d at 409-10, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 711-12. In a second broadcast,
a contractor who had been criticized in the first broadcast along with Brown appeared
to defend his work. Again, the reporter stated that Brown had turned down a request
to defend herself. However, Brown filed a declaration in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment stating that KCRA had not contacted her, that the report was
false, and that KCRA had been told by the Contractor's State License Board that the
allegations were false. Id.
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(3) (West 1982). Section 47(3) provides, in pertinent part,
that a publication or broadcast is privileged if made without malice and "to a person
interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested .. [hereinafter the "common-
interest .... privilege]. Id.; see infra note 20.
4. See Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 198 Cal. App. 3d 1106, 244 Cal. Rptr. 531
(1988), afj'd, 48 Cal. 3d 711, 771 P.2d 406, 257 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1989).
5. In this context, malice is defined as "a state of mind arising from hatred or ill
will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person." Brown, 48 Cal.
3d at 723, 771 P.2d at 411, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 713 (quoting Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d
part of the defendant that would overcome the privilege.6  The
supreme court accepted review only on the issue of whether the news
media is accorded a broad "public interest" privilege.7
II. BACKGROUND
The holding in this case is based largely on California statutory
law, although federal constitutional concerns are implicated. Section
47(3) of the California Civil Code, upon which both courts below re-
lied, does not create a broad-based privilege to report on matters of
public interest.8 However, both state law and the common law re-
garding defamation have been shaped and, in many instances, super-
seded by United States Supreme Court decisions during the last
twenty-five years.9 The defendant, along with members of the na-
tional media writing as amici curiae,' 0 urged the court to find a pub-
932, 944, 603 P.2d 58, 66, 160 Cal. Rptr. 141, 148 (1979)). This is referred to as "common
law malice." Id.
6. The supreme court set out to clarify what it considered to be incorrect termi-
nology in a number of cases dealing with privileges. The court stated that there is no
such thing as a "privileged defamation" or a "privilege to defame." Id. at 723 n.7, 771
P.2d at 412 n.7, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 714 n.7. A defamation is defined in sections 45 and 46
of the Civil Code as an "unprivileged" publication or communication, the former being
libel (written) and the latter being slander (oral). See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 45-46 (West
1982). The court believed it incorrect to state that the privilege can be overcome by a
showing of malice. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 723 n.7, 771 P.2d at 412 n.7, 257 Cal. Rptr. at
714 n.7. Instead, the privilege never arises if malice exists. Id. Finally, the privilege
itself is not conditional. Id. Rather, the occasion giving rise to publication, such as a
judicial proceeding, is conditionally privileged; that is, certain occasions and the ab-
sence of malice give rise to a privilege that is a "complete defense." Id. See generally
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander §§ 195-199 (2d ed. 1970 & Supp. 1989); 6 CAL. JUR. 3D
Assault and Other Willful Torts § 206 (3d ed. 1988); L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFA-
MATION § 83, at 448-50 (1978); 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS
§§ 5.26-.27 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 600, 603
(1977); 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 519 (9th ed. 1988); Com-
ment, 'Actual Malice" and the Standard of Proof in Defamation Cases in California:
A Proposal for a Single Constitutional Standard, 16 Sw. U.L. REV. 577, 591 (1986). For
the common law perspective, see J. TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE ON THE CHARGES CALLED
SLANDER AND LIBEL AND ON THE REMEDY BY CIVIL ACTION FOR THOSE WRONGS, To-
GETHER WITH A CHAPTER ON MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 296 (4th ed. 1890).
7. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 720, 771 P.2d at 410, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
8. Id. at 729, 771 P.2d at 416, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
9. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). A public official must
prove that a defamatory statement was made with actual malice, meaning "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Id. at 280. The U.S. Supreme Court later held "reckless disregard" to require evidence
that the "defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publica-
tion." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). For purposes of this article,
the malice standard set out in Sullivan will be referred to as "constitutional" malice; it
is a creation of constitutional interpretation rather than common law. See generally
Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983).
10. Amici curiae in the case included The Times Mirror Company; National
Broadcasting Company, Inc.; Hearst Corporation; CBS, Inc.; Gannett Co., Inc.; and
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.
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lic-interest privilege in section 47(3) based on the policies expressed
in these United States Supreme Court cases."' The issue and holding
in Brown are best understood in light of those Supreme Court deci-
sions, particularly Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.12
Gertz rejected the notion that a private plaintiff13 must show that
the defendant acted with constitutional malice, as required of public
officials by New York Times v. Sullivan.14 Instead, the Supreme
Court held that each state could determine the standard of liability
for the defamation of a private individual, as long as liability was not
imposed without fault.15 By permitting states to choose the standard
of liability for private figures, Gertz destroyed the media's argument
that the United States Supreme Court's holdings support the creation
of a "public-interest" privilege.16
Prior to Brown, it was unclear in California whether constitutional
malice or the lesser standard of negligence was required to impose li-
ability for the defamation of a private figure.17 With this holding,
California has joined the majority of states' 8 in requiring only a
11. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 721, 771 P.2d at 410, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
12. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See generally R. LABUNSKI, LIBEL AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1987); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975); Note, The
Gertz Case: Unbalancing Media Rights and Reputational Interests, 2 W. ST. U.L. REV.
227.
13. There was no contention in this case that the plaintiff was a public figure.
Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 722 n.4, 771 P.2d at 411 n.4, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 713 n.4. Even if the
court had found a statutory public-interest privilege in California, the mere fact that
the plaintiff was paid from funds borrowed by homeowners from a public agency-the
Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency-would be "too remote" to deem her
a public figure. Id. at 738 n.24, 771 P.2d at 422 n.24, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 724 n.24.
14. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the
United States Supreme Court held "public figures" to the standard established by Sul-
livan for plaintiffs who were public officials. See Christie, Underlying Contradictions
in the Supreme Court's Classification of Defamation, 1981 DUKE L.J. 811 (criticizing
the public-private figure distinction created by Gertz).
15. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. Liability without fault, or strict liability, was the stan-
dard prior to Sullivan. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 721, 771 P.2d at 410, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 712
(citing L. ELDREDGE, supra note 6, at 252-54); see 5 B. WITKIN, supra note 6, §§ 543-544.
16. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 723, 771 P.2d at 411, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
17. See, e.g., Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 347 (1980); see also Comment, As Time Goes By: Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and
Its Effect on California Defamation Law, 6 PAC. L.J. 565, 589 (1975); Comment, The
Nonmedia Figure and Strict Liability in California, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 253 (1984) (un-
certainty created by Gertz allows some states, including California, to revert to strict
liability in the case of a nonmedia defendant and a private figure).
18. Since Gertz, 33 states have adopted the lower standard of negligence for pri-
vate figures, six have applied a negligence standard without comment, and two federal
courts, as well as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, have interpreted local law to im-
showing of negligence.19
III. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Legislative History
The legislative history of section 47(3) suggests that it was intended
to be a codification of the common law privilege of "common inter-
est,"20 rather than a broad public-interest privilege for media defend-
ants.21 The statute apparently was based on the New York
codification of the common law privilege, which did not envision a
public-interest privilege for the media.22 The court stated that if the
legislature had intended to broaden the privilege to create a public-
interest privilege, then it would have explicitly done so. 23 Also, the
supreme court noted that the common law did not grant any greater
privileges to the press than it granted to ordinary citizens.24
B. Previous Interpretive Decisions
Previous decisions by the California Supreme Court did not con-
strue section 47(3) as creating a public-interest privilege for the defa-
mation of a private citizen.25 Prior case law applied the common
interest privilege, or the fair comment 26 defense, 27 to public figures
pose a negligence standard. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 741, 771 P.2d at 424-25, 257 Cal. Rptr.
at 726-27; see also infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
19. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 740, 771 P.2d at 424, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
20. One commentator noted:
A conditionally privileged occasion arises "if the communication [is] of such a
nature that it could be fairly said that those who made it had an interest in
making such a communication, and those to whom it was made had a corre-
sponding interest in having it made to them. When those two things co-exist
the occasion is a privileged one."
L. ELDREDGE, supra note 6, § 87 (quoting Hunt v. Great N. Ry., 2 Q.B. 189, 191 (1891));
see also 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Willful Torts §§ 220-222 (1988); F. HARPER,
supra note 6, § 5.26; 5 B. WITKIN, supra note 6, §§, 523-529.
21. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 727, 771 P.2d at 414, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
22. Id. at 728, 771 P.2d at 415, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
23. Id. at 729, 771 P.2d at 416, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The court noted that Wilson v.
Fitch, 41 Cal. 363 (1872), decided one year before the enactment of section 47(3), specif-
ically rejected the application of the privilege merely because the communication ap-
plied to a subject of public interest. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 729, 771 P.2d at 416, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 718. Legislators would have been aware of that decision and would have cor-
rected it had that been their intent. Id. at 730, 771 P.2d at 416, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
24. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 729, 771 P.2d at 416, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
25. Id.
26. To clarify the use of terms describing privileges, the supreme court noted that
the common-interest privilege and the right of fair comment were two separate de-
fenses under the common law. Id. at 732 n.18, 771 P.2d at 418 n.18, 257 Cal. Rptr. at
720 n.18. However, only the common interest privilege was codified in section 47(3).
Id. The fair-comment defense continues to be a viable defense in defamation actions
under the common law. Id. (citing Institute of Athletic Motivation v. University of Ill.,
114 Cal. App. 3d 1, 8 n.4, 170 Cal. Rptr. 411, 415 n.4 (1980)); see also Dairy Stores, Inc. v.
Sentinel Pub. Co., 104 N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220 (1986) (extending fair comment privilege
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or public officials, but not to matters of supposed "public interest" in-
volving private citizens.28 "Interest" in the phrase "common inter-
est" refers to private or pecuniary matters and not merely to topics of
general public interest.2 9 The court in Brown distinguished the type
of consumer affairs report at issue from the situation in which the
privilege arose because of a true common interest.30
Decisions by courts of appeal generally have followed the supreme
court's narrow view of the common-interest privilege, 31 but several
cases have mistakenly construed that view as creating a broader priv-
ilege than that which applies to matters of "public interest" and pri-
vate persons.32 The most recent appellate case to interpret correctly
the breadth of the statutory privilege was Rancho La Costa, Inc. v.
Superior Court.33 Prior to the decision in Brown, the conflicting
opinions at the appellate level created confusion regarding the scope
in New Jersey to false statements of fact on matters of public interest). See generally
J. TOWNSHEND, supra note 6, at 462, 590-91; 5 B. WITKIN, supra note 6, §§ 547-553.
27. The court believed it preferable to refer to the fair comment defense as a
"right rather than a privilege." Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 732 n.18, 771 P.2d at 418 n.18, 257
Cal. Rptr. at 720 n.18.28. Id. at 729-35, 771 P.2d at 416-20, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 718-22; see, e.g., Maidman v.
Jewish Publications, Inc., 54 Cal. 2d 643, 355 P.2d 265, 7 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1960) (an "indi-
vidual of renown" in Jewish community); Stevens v. Storke, 191 Cal. 329, 216 P. 371
(1923) (road builder not a public figure); Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198
P. 1 (1921) (Los Angeles police chief is a public figure); Newby v. Times-Mirror Co.,
173 Cal. 387, 160 P. 233 (1916) (political activity of well-known lawyer not a matter of
public interest); Gilman v. McClatchy, 111 Cal. 606 (1896) (private citizen accused of
raping household servant); Edwards v. Pub. Soc., 99 Cal. 431, 34 P. 128 (1893) (em-
ployee or agent of a utility deemed to be a private figure).
29. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 727, 771 P.2d at 414, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (citing Rancho
La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 664-65, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 358-59
(1980)).
30. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 733-34, 771 P.2d at 418-19, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21 (citing
Emde v. San Joaquin County Cent. Labor Council, 23 Cal. 2d 146, 143 P.2d 20 (1943)
(common interest between labor union that published newsletter and its members);
Schreidell v. Shoter, 500 So. 2d 228 (Fla. App. 1986) (privilege applied in action by
rabbi against member of board of directors of synagogue for statements made to other
directors); Fisher v. Illinois Office Supply Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 996, 474 N.E.2d 1263
(1984) (statements made in grievance and arbitration hearings); Bainhauer v. Ma-
noukian, 215 N.J. Super. 9, 520 A.2d 1154 (1987) (allegations among hospital physicians
about alleged deficiencies of a colleague)).
31. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 735, 771 P.2d at 420, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
32. Id. at 735-38, 771 P.2d at 420-22, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 722-24. To the extent Brown
is inconsistent by holding or dicta, the court disapproved Rollenhagen v. City of Or-
ange, 116 Cal. App. 3d 414, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981) (no privilege in reporting on fraud-
ulent automobile repair scam); Williams v. The Daily Review, Inc., 236 Cal. App. 2d
405, 46 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1965) (engineer awarded city road paving contract); Glenn v.
Gibson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 649, 171 P.2d 118 (1946) (owner of motel allegedly used by mili-
tary men to engage in illicit sex).
33. 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 105 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980) (privilege does not arise in re-
of privileges in California.34
C. Policy Considerations
Because the court premised its holding on the legislative intent be-
hind section 47(3),35 policy considerations were not as important as if
the issue had been purely one of common law.36 Nonetheless, the
many arguments raised by the defendants and the amici curiae
prompted the supreme court to weigh the competing policies raised
by this case. 37
1. The Legislature's Role and Media Self-determination
The supreme court believed that the proposed expansion of section
47(3) to include a public-interest privilege was so broad as to be more
appropriate for state legislative action. 38 The privilege would be all-
encompassing because it would permit media defendants to claim
that all of their communications were of public interest and therefore
privileged.39 This defense would be plausible in nearly every case be-
cause the function of the media is to publish or broadcast matters of
public interest.40
2. Majority Viewpoint in the United States
As stated above, California joined the majority of jurisdictions in
requiring that private figure plaintiffs need prove only negligence in
defamation actions.41 Only three states have applied the constitu-
tional malice standard to private-figure defamation suits, 42 and New
porting on alleged organized crime figures merely because of public interest in the
subject).
34. See Cate, Defining California Civil Code Section 47(3): The Resurgence of Self-
Governance, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (1987) (showing privilege has been extended be-
yond statutory intent, but urging California legislature or supreme court to adopt it);
Comment, Fair Comment in California: An Unwelcome Guest, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 173
(1983) (discussing conflict between Rollenhagen and previous decisions, then criticizing
expansion of privilege in that case).
35. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
36. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 739, 771 P.2d at 423, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 739-40, 771 P.2d at 423, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 725 (citing Cahill v. Hawaiian
Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975)).
39. Id. at 739, 771 P.2d at 423, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
40. The court explicitly noted that "the result implicitly sought by the media in
this case is a rule that in effect would be, 'If it is published, it is privileged.'" Id.
41. See supra notes 18-19; see also Collins & Drushal, The Reaction of the State
Courts to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 28 CASE W. RES. 306 (1978) (burden of proof is
equally as important as the standard of liability); Recent Development, State Court Re-
actions to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.: Inconsistent Results and Reasoning, 29 VAND.
L. REV. 1431 (1976) (media may be held to the standard of liability in each of the states
in which they broadcast or have circulation).
42. These are Colorado, Indiana, and New Jersey. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 741 n.30,
771 P.2d at 425 n.30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 727 n.30.
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York has adopted an intermediate position between constitutional
malice and negligence.43 The supreme court cited this trend among
the states as support for its position.44
3. The Importance of Reputation
While constitutional protections are required to prevent libel suits
from having a "chilling effect" on the free flow of news, the court be-
lieved that the importance of the individual's personal reputation is
an equally compelling interest.4 5 Changes in technology and business
have created an expansive media audience. Because it would be im-
practical for an individual defamed by the mass media to contact per-
sonally those who have heard a defamation, an individual's ability to
redress injury to reputation through a defamation action is needed
more today than during the eighteenth century.46 The court empha-
sized that private individuals, as opposed to either the media or those
who voluntarily enter the glare of public debate,47 are the benefi-
ciaries of the rule set forth in this case. 48
The supreme court also pointed out the possible anomaly that
could result in placing a greater burden on the private-rather than
the public-figure plaintiff if section 47(3) were construed as sug-
gested.49 If the public-interest privilege being urged upon the court
43. Id.; see F. HARPER, supra note 6, § 5.0, at 14.
44. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 742, 771 P.2d at 425, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
45. Id. at 742-44, 771 P.2d at 425-26, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 727-28. The supreme court
relied on Gertz for the basic proposition that an individual's reputation is deserving of
significant legal protections. Id. "[T]he individual's right to the protection of his own
good name 'reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth
of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.'"
Id. at 744, 771 P.2d at 426, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966))).
46. "[T]echnology has immeasurably increased the power of the press to do both
good and evil." Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 743-44, 771 P.2d at 426, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (citing
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 60 (1971)).
47. Id. at 744, 771 P.2d at 426, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 728 (citing Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344).
It is argued that, because public officials have greater access to the media than do pri-
vate individuals, the public official can presumably use his media exposure to counter-
act falsehoods directed against him. Id.
48. Id. See generally Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel
Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 22-28 (1983) (rejecting an absolute privilege
for any matter of public concern regardless of the involvement of a private figure).
But see Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation: Attacking the Bastion of
New York Times Co. v.' Sullivan, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501 (1981) (rejecting greater pro-
tections for private figures and urging a single standard of liability focusing on public
concern).
49. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 745, 771 P.2d at 427, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The supreme
court commented that it would be an "extremely rare case in which a journalist had
were adopted, then a private plaintiff would be forced to show com-
mon law maliceo to prevent the privilege from being invoked. A
public figure in the same scenario would be required to show only
constitutional malice,51 which he may have a better chance of prov-
ing than common law "hatred or ill will."52
4. Constitutional Protections for the Media
The supreme court rejected any argument that the California Con-
stitution provides greater free speech protection than the United
States Constitution.5 3 The court further noted that it would be un-
wise to expand a common law privilege at a time when the United
States Supreme Court has articulated a "panoply of constitutional
protections"5 4 for the media.55 The common law privileges such as
fair comment and common interest originally developed to give the
media some degree of protection from the prevailing strict liability
standard for false publications; however, a special need for these
privileges no longer exists given the media rights granted by the
Supreme Court,5 6 and any state action in this area would unnecessa-
rily complicate the law of defamation.5 7 As discussed below, the
supreme court did not foresee that its decision would have a chilling
effect on news operations, given the wide-ranging constitutional pro-
tections already favoring the media defendant.
In addition to the requirement in Sullivan that public figures
prove constitutional malice,58 the United States Supreme Court in
Gertz created three significant safeguards for the media: (1) a private
plaintiff must prove at least negligence;5 9 (2) if the speech involves a
matter of public concern, a private plaintiff also must show constitu-
tional malice to recover presumed or punitive damages;60 and (3) con-
actual hatred of a person on whom the journalist was reporting." Id. at 745 n.32, 771
P.2d at 427 n.32, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 729 n.32.
50. See supra note 5.
51. See supra note 9.
52. See supra notes 5, 49 and accompanying text.
53. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 746, 771 P.2d at 428, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 730. Every person
must be "responsible for the abuse" of the right of free speech. CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 2(a). This, the court noted, indicates that the individual's right to reputation is "wor-
thy of constitutional protection." Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 746, 771 P.2d at 428, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 730.
54. See supra note 9.
55. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 746-47, 771 P.2d at 428, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
56. Id. (citing W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 808 (5th ed. 1984)).
57. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 747-48, 771 P.2d at 428-29, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 730-31 (citing
Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 427 Mich. 157, 199-201, 398 N.W.2d 245, 264
(1986)).
58. See supra note 9.
59. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974).
60. Id. at 348-50.
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stitutional malice in this context must be shown by "clear and
convincing" evidence.61 Furthermore, a private plaintiff often will
have the burden of proving falsity against a media defendant regard-
ing matters of public concern.62
The supreme court also noted that the additional protections
granted the press in reporting on public figures likely have been the
cause of costly and rarely successful libel suits. 63 Finally, the court
added that media outlets are increasingly controlled by large and
profitable corporations, which lends credence to the belief that they
should compensate victims of their defamatory publications. 64
IV. IMPACT
In addressing policy considerations, the supreme court dismissed
the argument that its refusal to find a public-interest privilege will
have a chilling effect on news reporting.65 The court first cited a lack
of evidence regarding self-censorship by the press in states where
negligence rather than constitutional malice is the standard of liabil-
ity.66 The court added that little impact on news reporting will occur
because journalists strive for accuracy under their code of profes-
sional ethics. 67 In a similar vein, the court questioned whether work-
ing journalists and their editors actually contemplate privileges and
standards of liability in their rush to report the news.68 However,
there is substantial evidence of self-censorship by media outlets based
on the fear of libel suits and large damage awards.69
61. Id. at 342.
62. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986). If the publi-
cation is about a private figure and is also a matter of public concern, then the plaintiff
has the burden of proving its falsity. Id.
63. Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 750-51, 771 P.2d at 431, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
64. Id. at 755-56, 771 P.2d at 434-35, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37.
65. Id. at 748, 771 P.2d at 429-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 731-32.
66. Id. at 749, 771 P.2d at 430, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 732. The court noted that defend-
ants and amici curiae "have not identified a single instance in which they have de-
clined to report the news for fear that section 47(3) is riot as broad as they would like."
Id.
67. Id. at 748-50, 771 P.2d at 429-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. 731-32.
68. Id.
69. See Renas, Hartmann & Walker, An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect,
in THE COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 41-68 (1989); Note, Libel
and Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422 (1975) (self-censorship perpetuated by cost of
defending libel claims).
V. CONCLUSION
This case sorts through the confusion that had arisen in California
over defamation laws concerning private figures. In future cases, pri-
vate figure plaintiffs must prove only negligence by media defend-
ants, rather than the higher burden of constitutional malice, even if
the topic of the communication was a matter of putative "public in-
terest." The decision places California among the majority of states
on this issue.
The court's most compelling argument in rejecting the creation of
a statutory "public-interest" privilege is that it would make practi-
cally all publications and broadcasts privileged because the media is,
by its very nature, responsive to the public's interest.70 However,
whether the decision will have a "chilling effect" on aggressive news
reporting in California remains to be seen.71 The measure of any me-
dia "chilling" will be difficult-if not impossible-to calculate be-
cause the concept refers to media reports that will not occur
following this decision. However, this decision most directly ex-
amined statutory and common law privileges, even though matters of
constitutional law were implicated. The court sided with the private
individual held up to public scrutiny by the investigative media.
Should the burden prove too great on either the media or the public
it serves, the legislature likely will respond to their needs.
PAUL J. MCCUE
B. When a psychotherapist molests a minor child during the
course of individual counseling of mother and child for
intra-family problems, the mother has a claim for
negligent irfliction of emotional distress due to the
psychotherapist's breach of the duty of care to the mother
and child as patients: Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric
Medical Clinic, Inc.
In Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical C7inic, Inc.,' the
court decided whether a mother who consults a psychotherapist to
70. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
1. 48 Cal. 3d 583, 770 P.2d 278, 257 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1989). Two mothers obtained
counseling for their minor children to resolve family problems. The psychologist also
began treatment of the mothers. Upon discovering that the psychotherapist had sexu-
ally abused the children, the mothers filed suit for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer, and the court of appeal
affirmed, holding that the mothers failed to state a claim under either the "bystander
witness" theory, see infra note 2, or the "direct victim" theory, see infra note 3.
Although the suit originally alleged a similar cause of action against the clinic and its
owner and director, the court addressed no issues of vicarious liability. See id. at 588
n.3, 770 P.2d at 280 n.3, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 100 n.3.
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treat both herself and her minor child can state a claim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress when the psychotherapist sexually
molests her child. Without expressly stating if the "bystander wit-
ness" 2 or "direct victim" theories3 applied, the supreme court upheld
the mother's independent claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress because the molestation was a breach of the duty of care 4
owed by the psychotherapist to both the mother and the child as
patients.5
A cause of action based on negligent infliction of emotional distress
cannot rest solely on the foreseeability of the emotional distress.6
The emotional distress must result from the breach of a duty owed to
the plaintiff.7 As the counseling in this case involved intra-family
emotional problems, the therapist was treating both the mother and
the child as a single unit, although counseling each separately, to im-
prove the parent-child relationship. Thus, the therapist knew, or
2. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1962) (mother
could recover for the emotional distress resulting from witnessing the death of her
child). See also 46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 76 (1978 & Supp. 1989) (witnessing injury
to third person); Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of Com-
pensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477
(1984); Annotation, Right to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of Injury to An-
other, or Shock or Mental Anguish at Witnessing Such Injury, 29 A.L.R. 3D 1316
(1970). The court recently reconsidered Dillon and its progeny. See Thing v. LaChusa,
48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1989) (discussed in this survey, infra).
3. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980) (husband was direct victim of misdiagnosis of wife as having a sexually
transmitted disease, and, as a direct victim, had a cause of action for emotional dis-
tress). See also Comment, The Increasingly Disparate Standards of Recovery for Negli-
gently Inflicted Emotional Injuries, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 1017 (1983); Comment,
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Horizons After Molien v. Kaiser Foun-
dation Hospitals, 13 PAC. L.J. 179 (1981); Annotation, Necessity of Physical Injury to
Support Cause of Action for Loss of Consortium, 16 A.L.R. 4TH 518 (1982).
4. See generally 36 CAL. JUR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions §§ 162-163 (1977 &
Supp. 1989).
5. See Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 591, 770 P.2d at 282-83, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
Even though Justice Arguelles authored the majority opinion, he wrote separately to
stress that these facts would support liability for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 592-99, 770 P.2d at 283-88, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103-08 (Arguelles, J., concur-
ring). Justice Eagleson, concurring in the judgment, argued that the court's analogy to
the "direct victim" theory, see supra note 3, had no relevance, but believed that the
mothers had a cause of action based upon professional malpractice. Marlene F, 48 Cal.
3d at 599-601, 770 P.2d 288-89, 257 Cal Rptr. 108-09 (Eagleson, J., concurring).
6. The elements of this tort involve duty, breach, causation and damages,
although foreseeabilty helps to define the duty owed. See Marlene F, 48 Cal. 3d at 589-
90, 770 P.2d at 281-82, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
7. See id. at 590, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal Rptr. at 102. See generally 6 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 838-857 (9th ed. 1988) (negligence causing
emotional stress).
should have known, that the sexual molestation of the minor child
would directly cause emotional distress to the mother and damage
the parent-child relationship. The therapist's conduct, therefore, was
directed against both the mother and child, as they both were pa-
tients of the therapist.8
The court accepted the plaintiff's cause of action without applying
the facts to prior theories of recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.9 This step was not particularly bold as the psycho-
therapist was aware of the identity of his patients and the reasons
they sought counseling. Although the plaintiff conceivably could
have alleged an action for professional malpractice,0 the court ap-
peared to limit its holding to the facts of the case, and thus did not
greatly increase the scope of negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
MARK A. CLAYTON
C. The holding in Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation that
a party may receive only contract damages for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracts shall be applied retroactively:
Newman v. Emerson Radio Corporation.
The issue before the California Supreme Court in Newman v.
Emerson Radio Corporation1 was whether its decision last year in
Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation2 should be applied retroac-
8. See Marlene F., 48 Cal. 3d at 590-91, 770 P.2d at 282, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 102. See
also Richard H. v. Larry D., 198 Cal. App. 3d 591, 596, 243 Cal. Rptr. 807, 809-10 (1988)
(husband had cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon
marital therapist's sexual relations with wife).
9. Marlene F, 48 Cal. 3d at 592, 770 P.2d at 283, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 103. See gener-
ally Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772
(1985).
10. See supra note 5.
1. 48 Cal. 3d 973, 772 P.2d 1059, 258 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1989). Chief Justice Lucas
delivered the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Eagleson, and Arguelles con-
curred. Justice Broussard wrote a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justices Mosk
and Kaufman concurred.
2. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). In Foley, an employee
was terminated after he informed his former supervisor that he had heard his present
supervisor was under investigation for embezzlement. Id. at 664, 765 P.2d at 375-76,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14. The court recognized that a tort remedy is available if an em-
ployee is dismissed in violation of public policy. Id. at 670, 765 P.2d at 380, 254 Cal.
Rptr. at 218. The court held that the statute of frauds will not bar a contract recovery
if the employee can prove an implied-in-fact contract to discharge only for good cause.
Id. at 675, 765 P.2d at 383, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 221. The unsuccessful final claim alleged a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounding in tort. Id. at
682-83, 700, 765 P.2d at 389, 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227, 239-40; see California Supreme
Court Survey-November 1988-January 1989, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1143, 1227 (1989)
(discussing Foley).
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tively. Foley overruled a series of court of appeals decisions 3 by de-
claring that only contract and not tort damages are available for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an
employment contract. 4 Through Newman, the court gave Foley full
retroactive effect.5
The majority noted at the outset that whether or not Foley repre-
sented a new rule of law was not important in its retroactivity analy-
sis because California courts customarily give such decisions
retroactive effect. 6 Utilizing three factors,7 the court determined that
Foley did not fall within the narrow group of exceptions8 to that gen-
3. See, e.g., Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820
(1986); Gray v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 813, 226 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1986); Khanna
v. Microdata Corp., 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985); Rulon-Miller v. In-
ternational Business Machs. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984); Sha-
piro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984);
Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1983);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
4. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 700, 765 P.2d at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. See generally
Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
5. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 993, 772 P.2d at 1072, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 605. In Newman,
the employee brought three claims against his former employer, who had fired him
without cause: breach of an oral contract to terminate only for good cause, termination
in violation of public policy, and tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Id at 976-77, 772 P.2d at 1060-61, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94. The court
reversed the court of appeals' dismissal of the first claim, reiterating that the statute of
frauds does not bar recovery for breach of an oral contract. The court affirmed the
lower court's decision to allow the employee to allege sufficiently a violation of public
policy. It also affirmed the dismissal of the tort claim based on a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but it allowed the employee to amend his com-
plaint to allege a breach entitling him to contract damages. Id at 993, 772 P.2d at 1072-
73, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 605-06.
6. See, e.g., Peterson v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 147, 156, 642 P.2d 1305, 1306-07,
181 Cal. Rptr. 784, 785-86 (1982); Safeway Stores Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 333,
579 P.2d 441, 446-47, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555-56 (1978); Mark v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 7
Cal. 3d 170, 177-78, 496 P.2d 1276, 1280, 101 Cal. Rptr. 908, 912 (1972); Neel v. Magana,
Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 193, 491 P.2d 421, 432, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
848 (1971); Corning Hosp. Dist. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 488, 491, 494, 370 P.2d 325,
327, 329, 20 Cal. Rptr. 621, 623, 625 (1962); Cummings v. Morez, 42 Cal. App. 3d 66, 71,
116 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589 (1974); Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 254, 79
Cal. Rptr. 723, 724 (1969).
7. The three factors examined were (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule,
(2) the extent of reliance upon the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactive application
on the administration of justice. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 986, 772 P.2d at 1067, 258 Cal.
Rptr. at 600; see Peterson, 31 Cal. 3d at 152-53, 642 P.2d at 1307, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
8. For a list of cases having limited retroactivity, see 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE § 815 (3d ed. 1985). The court impliedly distinguished Moradi-Shalal v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988), which
allowed prospective application of a new ruling by acknowledging that, in contrast to
Foley, Moradi-Shalal eliminated a claim, not a remedy, and overruled a prior decision
eral rule.9 First, the court noted that limiting a breach of the implied
covenant award to contract damages would serve two important pur-
poses: it would better reflect the parties' expectations and provide
more predictability to employment contract actions.10 Second, the
court observed that fruitless reliance upon the prior tort remedy
would not leave a party without a claim or deprive an employee of a
vested right."1 Finally, because few, if any, retrials would be re-
quired, the court found that retroactivity would further the "adminis-
tration of justice."'12
In cases pending on January 30, 1989, the date Foley became final,
a party may seek only contract damages for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts. De-
spite the far-reaching impact of Foley, the court was unwilling to de-
part from the sound and generally accepted rule of full retroactive
application absent a showing of extraordinary hardship.13
BARRY J. REAGAN
D. To recover as a bystander under a theory of emotional
distress, the plaintiff must suffer severe emotional distress
as a result of actual presence and awareness at an event
causing injury to a victim closely related to the plaintiff:
Thing v. La Chusa.
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court has decisively transformed the neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress guidelines set forth in Dillon v.
of the supreme court rather than a lower court. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 982-83, 772
P.2d at 1064-65, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 597-98.
9. For discussions of the general rule of full retroactive application, see 16 CAL.
JUR. 3D Courts § 172 (1983 & Supp. 1989); 9 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 812
(3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1988).
10. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 988-89, 772 P.2d at 1069, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 602. See gener-
ally Gould, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13 EM-
PLOYEE REL. L.J. 404, 405-07 (1987); Note, "Contort": Tortious Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts-
Its Existence and Desirability, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 510, 526 n.94 (1985).
11. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 989-91, 772 P.2d at 1069-71, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 602-04. The
court also noted that any firm reliance on the prior rule would not be justified because
(1) Foley overruled lower court decisions, not its own; (2) the remedies available for
breach of the implied covenant were unsettled; and (3) the litigants had notice that the
court was going to review Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). Newman. 48 Cal. 3d at 986-87, 772 P.2d at 1067-68, 258 Cal. Rptr.
at 600-01.
12. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 991-92, 772 P.2d at 1071-72, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05.
13. Justice Broussard, in his dissenting opinion, concentrated his attack on the ma-
jority's perceived failure to distinguish Moradi-Shalal, see supra note 8, and the major-
ity's analysis of the reliance factor, see supra note 11. He felt that the reliance on the
prior tort claim justified prospective application. Newman, 48 Cal. 3d at 994-99, 772
P.2d at 1073-77, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 606-10 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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Legg' into doctrinal barriers.2 After twenty years of broad interpre-
tation of the circumstances under which a bystander may recover for
the emotional distress suffered when a close relative is injured in an
accident, 3 the court has reversed the trend in the recent decision of
Thing v. La Chusa.4.
Writing for the majority, Justice Eagleson made clear that policy
considerations dictated that some limitations be placed on the trend
toward unlimited liability.5 The court denied the plaintiff recovery
because she arrived at the accident scene after an automobile-pedes-
trian collision had left her son bleeding and unconscious. 6 Conse-
quently, she failed to satisfy the requirement that a plaintiff must be
"present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it oc-
curs .... ,7 The court clearly realized the effect of its holding in
Thing on earlier cases with broader interpretations: "To the extent
they are inconsistent with this conclusion, . [they] are
disapproved."8
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Each step in the development of the law involving the negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress must be understood in light of two com-
peting interests. On one hand rests the societal need to provide a
civilized forum for the aggrieved to seek redress.9 On the other hand
lies an intuitive mistrust of emotional injuries because of the difficul-
ties in proving genuine harm.1O As a result of these competing inter-
ests, the law more closely resembles a compromise than a guidepost
of stellar clarity.11
1. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
2. Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A
Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 492 (1982).
3. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980); Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
4. 48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1989); see Carrisoza, Justices
Limit Lawsuits for Mental Distress, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 28, 1989, at 10, col. 1.
5. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 667, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880. Justice Eagle-
son's opinion for the court was joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli and
Arguelles. Justice Kaufman concurred in a separate opinion. Justices Mosk and
Broussard each dissented separately.
6. Id. at 647, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
7. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
8. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
9. Pearson, supra note 2, at 486.
10. Note, Limiting Liability for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (1981).
11. Pearson, supra note 2, at 483.
A. The Impact Rule
Originally, the law sought to guarantee the authenticity of emo-
tional harm by limiting recovery to those plaintiffs who actually suf-
fered some sort of physical impact as well.12 Obviously, the more
grave the physical injury, the more certain a court could be that the
emotional harm was real, not feigned. 13 However, the so-called "im-
pact rule" was unreasonably harsh, or subject to absurd manipula-
tion. In cases in which severe emotional distress was suffered but no
physical contact was made, recovery was denied. As a consequence,
some courts construed even the slightest bump or touch as physical
contact, even though it caused no harm in and of itself.14 In recogni-
tion of the artificial nature of the impact rule, the contact require-
ment was dropped, and the zone of danger rule was adopted in an
effort to limit liability.'5
B. The Zone of Danger Rule
The court in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.16 discarded
the requirement that a bystander suffer some sort of physical impact
in order to recover for emotional distress. Rather, the court ex-
tended recovery to a plaintiff who encountered emotional distress,
out of fear for his own safety, while within the zone of danger cre-
ated by the defendant's negligence.17 The Restatement also adopted
the zone of danger rule, but it allowed recovery even if the plaintiff's
distress was the result of "[s]hock or fright at harm or peril to a
member of his immediate family occurring in his presence."' 8 Never-
theless, both variations of the rule would deny recovery to a plaintiff
who experienced severe emotional distress but who, because of the
peculiar circumstances of a given situation, was not exposed to any
danger himself.19
12. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 738, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79
(1968).
13. Note, supra note 10, at 849.
14. Id. at 848; see W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at
363 (5th ed. 1984); Pearson, supra note 2, at 488.
15. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 332, 379 P.2d at 536, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 56. The "zone of danger" is defined
as the area in which the bystander himself is also exposed to physical harm by the de-
fendant's negligence. This is contrasted with the area outside the zone of danger where
the plaintiff enjoys relative freedom from physical harm, but may still be able to ob-
serve the harm caused to the victim. Note, supra note 10, at 849.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
19. A more complete criticism of the zone of danger rule is provided in Dziokonski
v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). The court's basic problem with the
rule was its failure to provide relief to all whose injuries were reasonably foreseeable.
Further, suffering emotional distress from a position of relative safety may be just as
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C. Dillon v. Legg
The facts in Dillon provided a situation in which the proper appli-
cation of the zone of danger rule would have led to an anomalous re-
sult. In Dillon, a young girl was struck by an automobile while her
mother and sister watched helplessly. The victim's sister was close
enough to the accident to be considered within the zone of danger.
The mother, however, was standing on the sidewalk when the acci-
dent occurred, and although she witnessed the mishap, she was
clearly out of the zone of danger.20
In an effort to develop a more just result, while balancing the need
to avoid unlimited liability, the California Supreme Court fashioned a
set of guidelines which limited foreseeability in bystander cases. The
Dillon decision established the following factors to be considered in
determining foreseeability:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted
with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff'from the sensory and con-
temporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship.2 1
These factors offered a mechanism to extend recovery to bystanders
outside the zone of danger, thereby allowing both the mother and the
sister to be compensated in the Dillon case.
Since the Dillon decision was handed down in 1968, other courts
have expanded the definition of foreseeability to include plaintiffs
who were not even present -at the scene when the accident oc-
curred.2 2 At least one court sought to allow recovery for an absent
plaintiff by labeling him a "direct victim," not a "bystander," while
profound as that suffered from within the zone of danger. Id. at 562, 380 N.E.2d at
1300.
20. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 737-38, 441 P.2d 912, 918-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 78-
79 (1968).
21. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
22. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1985) (mother whose son suffered and died over a period of several days from mis-
diagnosis prevailed even though the event was not sudden, and the negligent cause was
not readily apparent); Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 3d 553, 145 Cal. Rptr.
657 (1978) (mother allowed recovery when child drowned, even though mother did not
arrive until after rescue efforts were well under way); Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station, 63 Haw. 557, 632 P.2d 1066 (1981) (negligent infliction of emotional distress by-
stander recovery allowed for distress suffered by family for loss of pet, even though
family was not present when injury was suffered, and no human suffered physical
injury).
distinguishing the plaintiff in Dillon as a mere "percipient witness."23
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the evening of December 8, 1980, the plaintiff, Maria Thing,
was in her kitchen when her daughter burst into the room scream-
ing: "They hit Johnny."24 Immediately, the plaintiff dashed to the
scene, only to find her young son lying on the ground unconscious.
His left arm was bleeding due to injuries sustained in a pedestrian-
automobile accident.25 Although the plaintiff was located near the
scene, she neither heard nor saw the impact when the defendant
struck her son. The plaintiff alleged that upon her arrival at the
scene, she thought her son was dead and, as a result, suffered shock
and severe emotional distress.26
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment because the plaintiff failed to meet the contemporaneous per-
ception element suggested in Dillon.27 However, despite prior
decisions to the contrary, the court of appeal held that a contempora-
neous perception of the "immediate consequences" was sufficient to
uphold the plaintiff's cause of action.28 The court of appeal cited
Ochoa v. Superior Court29 as authority for its proposition that the
factors in Dillon were guidelines rather than strict requirements.
This interpretation enabled the court to conclude that none of the
Dillon factors was, by itself, essential to recovery. 30
The California Supreme Court granted review to examine the
court of appeal's reading of Ochoa as authority for its holding, and to
delineate the circumstances under which a bystander may properly
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress.3 1
IV. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority identified one issue specific to the facts of the case,
23. In Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr.
831 (1980), the wife, who was misdiagnosed as having syphilis, was instructed to tell
her husband to be examined as well. The court viewed the husband as a direct victim.
His involvement was compelled by the doctor's negligence, and as a result he tran-
scended the role of a mere bystander. Id. at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
834.
24. Carrizosa, supra note 4, at 10.
25. Id.
26. Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal. 3d 644, 647-48, 771 P.2d 814, 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. 865,
866 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 648, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
29. 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985).
30. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 648, 771 P.2d at 816, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68.
31. Id. at 648, 771 P.2d at 816, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
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and further realized a broader opportunity to resolve judicial confu-
sion regarding the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The narrower issue presented by Thing asked whether a closely re-
lated plaintiff, absent from the scene of an accident at the moment it
occurs, may recover for the emotional distress suffered upon arrival
at the scene shortly thereafter.32 This allowed an examination of the
more significant question: whether the "guidelines" presented in Dil-
lon properly define the parameters of negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress in California. 33
The California Supreme Court discussed several policy goals im-
pacting its decision. First, emotional distress is a type of harm which
is properly compensable under the law.3a Second, liability for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress ought to maintain a "reasonable
relationship to the culpability of the negligent defendant."35 Third,
liability ought to have reasonable limits in order to provide a more
predictable risk for insurance purposes.36
In an effort to reconcile these needs, the majority found the factors
in Dillon, if employed as strict requirements, would effectively con-
tain liability while providing compensation to deserving plaintiffs.37
As a consequence of this determination, the plaintiff in Thing was de-
nied recovery because she was not present at the scene when the ac-
cident occurred. 38
32. Id. at 646-47, 771 P.2d at 815, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
33. Id.; see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
34. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 650, 771 P.2d at 817, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 868. Regarding inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, the court noted that the common law has recog-
nized a "[right to be free from socially unacceptable conduct that seriously affects
another's peace of mind." Id. at 648, 771 P.2d at 816, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 867. The major-
ity recited a definition of emotional distress in intentional torts as "[f]right, nervous-
ness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as
physical pain." Id. at 648-49, 771 P.2d at 816, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 867 (quoting Deevy v.
Tassi, 21 Cal. 2d 109, 130 P.2d 389 (1942)). The majority further observed the common
law's willingness to quantify damages, even in the absence of physical manifestations,
based on a review of the relevant circumstances by the trier of fact. Id. at 650, 771 P.2d
at 817, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (citing Slate Rubbish Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338,
240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952)). This approach allows the court to compensate equally a com-
paratively strong plaintiff, and one who is less emotionally stable. Id.
35. Id. at 687, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
36. Id. at 665, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
37. Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81.
38. Id. at 669, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
1. Liability Limitations in Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress
In analyzing the limits on liability associated with both the impact
and the zone of danger rules, the majority concluded that traditional
concepts of foreseeability and duty operated as limiting factors. 39
First, those who did not suffer an impact, or who were beyond the
zone of danger, could not recover because they were owed no duty of
care. Even if the emotional distress was foreseeable, the defendant
had no duty to refrain from generating a risk.40
Second, the court explained the simple understanding that shock
or fright without any associated physical injuries was not reasonably
foreseeable.41 Consequently, recovery in negligence actions was de-
nied based on the lack of foreseeability.
Third, the majority found several of the policy considerations for
limiting liability in Amaya still appropriate today.42 The court recog-
nized the difficulty in distinguishing fraudulent claims from genuine
causes of action, as well as the problems with quantifying the injury
created by the emotional distress.43 Another consideration involves
the difficulty in finding a logical place to limit liability, although the
court held that economic and moral considerations demand that lia-
bility be limited within reasonable confines. 44 A final consideration
involves judicial consistency with established tort law. While the in-
tentional tortfeasor is generally held to answer for all consequences
of his actions, liability in negligence generally follows only what is
reasonably foreseeable.45
The majority observed that the limiting factors in Dillon had been
referred to as "guidelines," which enabled courts to either expand or
39. Id. at 652, 771 P.2d at 818, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 868. For a more detailed discussion
of foreseeability as a limitation on liability, see Pearson, supra note 2, at 490-501.
40. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 652, 771 P.2d at 818, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 869; Pearson, supra
note 2, at 489.
41. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 652, 771 P.2d at 818, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 869; see W. KEETON,
supra note 14, at 361.
42. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 652, 771 P.2d at 818, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 869 (citing Amaya v.
Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963)); see
W. KEETON, supra note 14, at 360-61.
43. Courts have recognized that emotional distress may be easily feigned, in spite
of expert testimony to the contrary. Mental health professionals still may be fooled on
occasion because emotional distress does not always produce outward manifestations.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment b (1965).
44. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 652, 771 P.2d at 818, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 869 (citing Amaya, 59
Cal. 2d at 295, 379 P.2d at 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 33). Generally, tort law has looked to
the concept of foreseeability to define the boundaries of the defendant's liability in a
negligence action. One notable exception is the "thin skull" rule, whereby the defend-
ant is also responsible for unforeseeable consequences. However, this liability only
goes as far as the actual physical injury sustained. Pearson, supra note 2, at 477 n.3.
45. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 652, 771 P.2d at 818-19, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70.
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ignore them altogether.46 The majority also noted that the original
Dillon decision intended these factors to be applied on an ad hoc or
case-by-case basis.47 As a result, decisions at the appellate level were
inconsistent and unpredictable. The majority expressed a strong con-
cern that courts in the wake of Dillon had given too little attention
to the impact of ever expanding liability.48
2. Clarification
The court observed that adoption of a pure foreseeability rule in
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases would essentially cre-
ate the intolerable situation of unlimited liability.49 Therefore, the
court concluded that a "bright line" was essential to meet realistic in-
surance concerns and to control the cost of administration.5 0
The majority flatly acknowledged that any bright line in negligent
46. Id. at 654, 771 P.2d at 820, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 870. Apparently, the court did not
wholly disagree with Dillon but, instead, envisioned a stricter interpretation of a basi-
cally sound premise.
47. Id. at 655, 771 P.2d at 820, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 871. Relegating the decision of
what constitutes negligent infliction of emotional distress in a bystander cause of ac-
tion to a case-by-case basis does little more than delay deciding exactly where to draw
the line. In the meantime, the lower courts are expected to make those decisions with-
out guidance from the California Supreme Court. The majority pointed out that "the
Dillon court was satisfied that trial and appellate courts would be able to determine
the extent of a duty because the court would know it when it saw it." Id. at 655, 771
P.2d at 821, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 872 (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring)).
48. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 667, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
49. Id. at 663, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877. The majority commented that
"there are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and thus determine
liability but none on which foresight alone provides a socially and judicially acceptable
limit on recovery of damages for that injury." Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr.
at 881.
The majority also examined two proposals in an effort to eliminate the arbitrary na-
ture of bystander recovery. Id. at 662-63, 771 P.2d at 825-26, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77.
The first proposal, a return to the impact rule, was found to be no less arbitrary than
the current state of the law. It still is vulnerable to the original problems of inconse-
quential impacts providing an excuse to allow recovery, and harsh results for a deserv-
ing plaintiff suffering in the absence of any impact. The second proposal suggested
that recovery be allowed exclusively for economic loss. This, too, was rejected as no
less arbitrary than the current law, with the additional disadvantage that it would ex-
tend recovery to all foreseeable plaintiffs, not just to those who are closely related. Id.
at 663, 771 P.2d at 826, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 877. It is unclear, however, just what would be
included as an "economic loss." The Thing court suggested that economic loss is
merely out-of-pocket damages. It appears that the proposal would entail allowing the
plaintiff to recover the costs associated with psychiatric counselling and lost income.
Most likely, any losses claimed strictly as emotional suffering would be disallowed. Id.
50. Id. at 664, 771 P.2d at 827, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (citing Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal.
3d 267, 277, 758 P.2d 582, 588, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254, 260 (1988)).
infliction of emotional distress must be somewhat arbitrary, but cited
several justifications for its holding.51 First, since money does not re-
ally undo the damage suffered, the fact that some deserving plaintiffs
will go uncompensated is considered less critical. 52 Second, given the
difficulty in assessing the value of the harm, a bright line would al-
low only the most deserving plaintiffs to recover.5s Third, society as
a whole must bear the costs of increased litigation and insurance ex-
penses if a broader group of potential plaintiffs is entitled to compen-
sation.5 4 Finally, the court pointed out that the vast majority of
emotional distress goes uncompensated because it is a normal part of
life, and is not caused by the fault of another. 55
Based on these justifications, the majority found that the best solu-
tion was to construct a law which offers relief only to those who suf-
fer the most.56 The majority concluded its examination by holding
that the facts in Dillon are to be treated as threshold requirements
for recovery under negligent infliction of emotional distress.57 The
majority also held that to the extent any prior case suggested a
broader interpretation of the law, it was overruled.58
B. The Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Justice Kaufman struck at the very heart of
negligent infliction of emotional distress by suggesting that freedom
therefrom should not be a legally protected interest. He criticized as
too rigid the majority's treatment of the Dillon factors as threshold
requirements, thus creating the obvious result of disparate treatment
51. Id. at 666, 771 P.2d at 828, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
52. Id. at 667, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880. This argument raises the ques-
tion: if money does not undo the damage, why are monetary damages awarded to the
plaintiff under any circumstances? This line of reasoning supports the concept of lim-
iting damages exclusively to economic loss. See supra note 49.
53. While assessing the value of the harm in an emotional distress suit may be dif-
ficult, courts generally have been more willing to try when the cause is intentional
rather than negligent. See supra note 34. While the additional culpability enters into
the calculation, the focus, in either case, is on the resultant damage.
54. Clearly, the impact the holding in this case would have on liability insurance
was a key consideration. At least three insurance associations were represented as
amici curiae. Carrizosa, supra note 4, at 10.
55. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 666-67, 771 P.2d at 828-29, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
56. The court stated recovery would be available:
if... and only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is
present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is
then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers
serious emotional distress-a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated
in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the
circumstances.
Id. at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 668, 771 P.2d at 830, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
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among equally deserving plaintiffs.59 Yet Justice Kaufman also
found fault with the dissent's recommendation to retain Dillon in its
original, more flexible form,60 recognizing this as a course which al-
ready has led to substantial confusion and inconsistency in the lower
courts.
6 1
Justice Kaufman further criticized the majority's holding because
its arbitrary nature resembled institutionalized caprice. He stated
that this kind of decision operates to discredit the judiciary and un-
dermines the respect for the law that justice commands.62 Moreover,
he believed that negligent infliction of emotional distress was too uni-
versal an experience for the law to become involved with, and he rec-
ommended that "bystander liability should not be retained." 63 Based
on these criticisms, and despite stare decisis, Justice Kaufman would
have denied recovery for the plaintiff in Thing merely because she
harbored no fear for her own safety.64
C. The Dissenting Opinions
In his dissent, Justice Broussard exhibited an unswerving faith in
the natural limits on liability created by the application of foresee-
ability.65 He argued that foreseeability alone should determine liabil-
ity in order to preserve the original flexibility of Dillon, thereby
avoiding unjust and arbitrary results. 6 6 In addition, Justice Brous-
sard also proposed that courts look to several additional considera-
tions, apart from the three guideposts of Dillon, to aid them in
59. 1& at 670, 771 P.2d at 831, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (Kaufman, J., concurring). For
a hypothetical example of such disparate treatment, see inkfra note 79 and accompany-
ing text.
60. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 689, 771 P.2d at 844, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 895 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring).
61. Justice Kaufman suggested that the zone of danger rule became arbitrary once
the requirement that the plaintiff fear for his own safety was dropped and replaced by
the requirement that the plaintiff must at least suffer fear for the safety of another.
I& at 671, 771 P.2d at 832, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 883 (Kaufman, J., concurring). He further
noted that a majority of jurisdictions have rejected the Dillon rule precisely because
there is no logical place to draw the line on liability. Id. at 672-73, 771 P.2d at 833, 257
Cal. Rptr. at 884 (Kaufman, J., concurring). Justice Kaufman also observed that
whether the Dillon guidelines are applied in a rigid or flexible manner, they always
will reach a point at which they become arbitrary. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 675, 771 P.2d at 835, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
63. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 676, 771 P.2d at 836, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 682, 771 P.2d at 839, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 890 (Broussard, J., dissenting). Be-
cause Justice Mosk's dissent was written to amplify Justice Broussard's dissent, Justice
Broussard's arguments are presented first.
66. Id. (Broussard, J., dissenting).
determining foreseeability.67 In particular, they should first concen-
trate on the relationship between the defendant's conduct and the
risk of injury. As the nexus between the two becomes more tenuous,
the likelihood of finding any liability also should decrease. Another
consideration is the effect of liability on the defendant and the com-
munity as a whole. Modernly, this is closely related to Justice Brous-
sard's final consideration: the cost and availability of insurance.68
The burden borne by the defendant and the community is tied to in-
surance: before the accident by resources dedicated to premiums,
and afterward by policy limits which may not cover the entire
amount owed. Justice Broussard concluded that recovery should be
allowed because the plaintiff did perceive the immediate conse-
quences of the accident, and according to the development of case law
since Dillon, her experience qualified as a contemporaneous
perception.6 9
Justice Mosk generally agreed with Justice Broussard that Dillon
provided the proper balance by limiting liability while allowing suffi-
cient flexibility; however, Justice Mosk took issue with the majority's
analysis of several fundamental cases.70 In the majority's treatment
of Krouse v. Graham, 71 there was no mention of the fact that the
plaintiff, who did not actually see the impact, nevertheless had a con-
temporaneous sensory perception of the accident because he heard
it.72 Justice Mosk was quick to point out that "sensory" means any
one of the senses, including hearing.73 He was also unable to find
any broad extension of foreseeability in Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals.74 The husband in Molien submitted to a physcial examina-
tion because his wife had been misdiagnosed as having syphilis. Jus-
67. Justice Broussard's dissent put forth these additional factors for consideration:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defend-
ant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden
to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. at 686, 771 P.2d at 842, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 893 (Broussard, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 112-13, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100
(1968)).
68. One of the arguments presented to the court was the direct correlation be-
tween insurance costs and a more liberal interpretation of Dillon. Carrizosa, supra
note 4, at 10; see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
69. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 688-89, 771 P.2d at 844, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 895 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
70, Id. at 677, 771 P.2d at 836, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
71. 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977).
72. See id. at 76, 562 P.2d at 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
73. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 677, 771 P.2d at 836, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
74. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); see supra note 23.
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tice Mosk maintained that the husband was not merely a bystander,
but was actually an injured victim. 75 Justice Mosk concluded that
the courts should simply look to the definition of emotional distress
provided by the Restatement in order to distinguish between compen-
satory and noncompensatory claims.76
'VII. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The holding in Thing will "dramatically cut back on emotional dis-
tress claims" by significantly narrowing the number of eligible plain-
tiffs.77 Implicit in the court's restrictive interpretation of the factors
in Dillon is the suggestion that a more technical reading of these ele-
ments will be required of the lower courts.
The decision implies that the court will deny recovery to even the
closest of friends because they fail to meet the "closely related" re-
quirement. 78 Moreover, the type of emotional distress which the
court would find compensable is likely limited to shock, fright, and
anxiety. Although the court does mention humiliation and indignity
as compensable in intentional torts, one could infer that these emo-
tions are beyond the scope of the court's determination.79 It also can
75. Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 678-79, 771 P.2d at 837, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Mosk, J., dis-
senting). Justice Mosk criticized the majority by re-emphasizing that the holding in
Ochoa was consistent with the factors in Dillon. Id. at 680, 771 P.2d at 838, 257 Cal.
Rptr. at 889 (Mosk, J., dissenting). He believed the majority's focus was not on the
holding, but rather, the dictum. Id. (Mask, J., dissenting). It was the dictum in Ochoa
which suggested that the Dillon factors were merely guidelines, and thus not required
in a foreseeability analysis. See id. at 660, 771 P.2d at 824, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
76. Id. at 681, 771 P.2d at 839, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 890 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "The
law intervenes only when the distress is so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965).
77. Carrisoza, supra note 4, at 10. It is important to note the emphatic language of
the court in creating these requirements: "We conclude, therefore, that a plaintiff may
recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted
injury of a third person if, but only i, said plaintiff meets the three Dillon elements."
Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 667, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (emphasis added).
78. The majority commented that if liability is extended to include those who are
not closely related, then it threatens to become "unlimited." Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 666-
67, 771 P.2d at 828-29, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81. Hence, it can be fairly inferred that the
court has little interest in broadening the definition of what it means to be "closely
related."
79. The majority opinion exhibits a tension in trying to define a rule of law that
would allow recovery only for the most severe circumstances. The majority firmly
would disallow recovery to a deserving plaintiff who may have come upon an accident
just moments after its occurrence (even though the plaintiff is distraught with shock
and anxiety). See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. Thus, it is difficult to im-
agine that recovery would be allowed for the "lesser" emotional harm of indignity or
humiliation.
be fairly assumed that "injury" (in the first and second elements) re-
fers exclusively to physical injury, given the context of the opinion.8 0
The most significant impact of the holding in Thing is its propen-
sity to produce an anomalous result. An obvious illustration involves
two parents sitting on the porch watching their child at play in the
front yard. At the moment the child is hit by an automobile, the fa-
ther is watching and the mother is reading and listening to music
through a set of headphones. A proper application of the court's
holding would allow recovery to the child's father, while denying re-
covery to the mother, even though she was aware of the accident lit-
erally seconds after its occurrence.8 1
One question not squarely addressed by the opinion is exactly what
constitutes an injury-producing event. The court seems to suggest
that the type of accident which would lead to the negligent infliction
of emotional distress would be sudden in nature because, under such
circumstances, most people are likely to experience shock or fright.8 2
A more difficult situation arises when the injury-producing event
lasts several minutes, or even hours. In the case of a drowning vic-
tim, it may be difficult to ascertain whether the victim is alive or
dead. It would be incongruous to allow recovery to the bystander
who found a victim who had been floating dead in a swimming pool
for several hours, and then deny recovery to the plaintiff in Thing
who arrived on the scene within moments to find her son uncon-
scious and bleeding.
Notwithstanding some of the drawbacks this decision may have for
80. The first two elements from the holding in Thing require that the plaintiff:
"(1) is closely related to the injury victim; [and] (2) is present at the scene of the injury
producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the
victim .... " Thing, 48 Cal. 3d at 667-68, 771 P.2d at 829, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81. Jus-
tice Mosk criticized the majority for its failure to recognize that Molien could still con-
stitute the requisite physical injury. Id. at 681, 771 P.2d at 838, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 889
(Mosk, J., dissenting); see Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813,
167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (wife misdiagnosed as having syphilis, and both she and her
husband underwent a physical examination as a result).
81. The concurrence would solve this problem by reinstituting the zone of danger
rule, thereby allowing neither parent to recover, because both were outside the zone at
the time of impact. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. On the other hand,
each dissent would allow both parents to recover-the father because he witnessed the
injuries, and the mother because she saw the immediate consequences of the accident.
See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
82. See Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 883 (1973) (recovery denied where plaintiffs watched daughter die a slow death
as a result of a misdiagnosis). The court in Jansen explained that what was contem-
plated by Dillon was a sudden event, lasting for a short duration. If the physical in-
jury occurs over a longer period, there is time to adapt and adjust emotionally, which
decreases the shock. But see Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 167, 703 P.2d 1, 7,
216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 667 (1985) ("Our review of other cases allowing a cause of action for
emotional duties under Dillon leads us to the conclusion that the 'sudden occurrence'
requirement is an unwarranted restriction on the Dillon guidelines.").
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an individual plaintiff, Thing may hold some real and tangible bene-
fits. "The insurance industry is a conduit, not a cornucopia," which
translates extensions in liability into increased premiums in order to
spread the risk.8 3 If the court had extended recovery to those who
arrived after the injury had occurred, it would have increased the
number of possible plaintiffs, thereby increasing the risk exposure
that must be reflected in higher premiums.8 4 It also would have
spawned the question: how much later may a plaintiff arrive, and still
be entitled to recover? While many close relatives may not reach the
accident scene before the victim is transported, there are few who do
not suffer emotional distress upon arrival at the hospital.
A second future benefit provided by Thing is a contemplated fron-
tal assault on fraud. A plaintiff who has observed a close relative re-
ceive injuries is unlikely to escape emotional injury. Because most
juries will not have to divine whether a claim is genuine, the number
of fraudulent claims erroneously compensated should decrease. More
importantly, because Thing restricts those plaintiffs who may bring a
cause of action, claims which ultimately would not survive judicial
scrutiny will not be initiated simply for their settlement value.
Either way, the costs associated with fraud in negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases will be decreased. As a consequence of
Thing, the courts may see a shift toward recovery of intangible loss
as a part of a wrongful death action when the victim's injuries result
in death.8 5
VIII. CONCLUSION
Some may see Thing as an attempt by the California Supreme
Court to "jury-proof" bystander recovery in negligent infliction of
emotional distress cases. Using the Dillon factors as threshold re-
quirements ensures that only the most severe circumstance is consid-
ered for relief. In essence, the court has developed a formula which
almost always ensures a deserving plaintiff by stipulating that the
plaintiff be near the accident scene, actually witness it as it occurs,
and be closely related to the injured victim. This judicial certainty,
83. Carrisoza, supra note 4, at 10.
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. While loss of companionship is compensable in a wrongful death action, grief
generally is not. Note, supra note 10, at 869. To the extent the law provides some re-
dundancy in this area, relief still may be available for an aggrieved party who arrives
after the fact. See id. at 847 (citing Manie v. Natson Oldsmobile-Cadillac Co., 378 Mich.
650, 655, 148 N.W.2d 779, 781-82 (1967)).
however, also carries with it an expensive blow to the compensation
of victims, because the same elements that limit liability also are sure
to screen some of the most deserving plaintiffs because they fail to
meet the technical requirements of the law.
JAMES DUFF MCGINLEY
VII. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
In the absence of extreme or outrageous conduct, the
exclusive .remedy against the independent claims
administrator of a self-insured employer for the delay or
refusal to pay compensation benefits is a claim through
the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board: Marsh &
McLennan, Inc. v. Superior Court.
In Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Superior Court,1 the California
Supreme Court held that when an independent claims administrator
or adjustor of a self-insured employer unreasonably delays or refuses
to pay compensation benefits, the exclusive remedy for the employee
or the dependents of the employee must be sought through the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) pursuant to sections
3602,2 53003 and 58144 of the Labor Code. In so holding, the court
overruled the court of appeal's decision in Dill v. Claims Administra-
tion Services, Inc.5 However, the court noted that even though the
employee's dependent could not maintain a common law cause of ac-
tion for the recovery of compensation, a claims administrator may be
liable under Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange6 if the administra-
1. 49 Cal. 3d 1, 774 P.2d 762, 259 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1989). The widow of an employee
whose death was covered by workers' compensation benefits filed suit in superior
court against the self-insured employer's independent claims administrator. The com-
plaint alleged fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary
duty, and violation of the Insurance Code. The superior court sustained Marsh & Mc-
Lennan's demurrer to the complaint as to the Insurance Code violation. The court of
appeal denied the subsequent petition for writ of mandate by Marsh & McLennan.
Justice Panelli wrote the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Lucas and Jus-
tices Broussard, Eagleson, Kaufman, and Kennard concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a
separate dissenting opinion.
2. Section 3602 states that the sole remedy of an employee or the employee's de-
pendents is the recovery of compensation. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1989).
3. Section 5300 gives the WCAB exclusive jurisdiction for claims relating to the
recovery of compensation and the enforcement of those claims. Id. § 5300 (West 1971).
4. Section 5814 states that if the WCAB finds a delay or refusal to pay the com-
pensation to be unreasonable, the full amount of the recovery will be increased ten
percent. Id. § 5814.
5. 178 Cal. App. 3d 1184, 224 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1986). In Dill, the court held that a
claims administrator was neither an employer nor an insurer and thus was "a person
'other than an employer' against whom [the plaintiff] is allowed to maintain an action
in the superior court." Id. at 1189, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 276; see CAL. INS. CODE §§ 3850,
3852; Marsh & McLennan, 49 Cal. 3d at 7-9, 774 P.2d at 765-66, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 736-37.
6. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
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tor's actions are so extreme and outrageous as to effectively remove
them from the role of a claims administrator.7
In Marsh & McLennan, the court's decision that the WCAB is the
appropriate forum for deciding issues of delay or cessation of benefits
was based on several reasons. First, the legislature has stated that
the sole and exclusive remedy against an employer by an injured em-
ployee is the recovery of workers' compensation benefits.8 The legis-
lature also has given exclusive jurisdiction to the WCAB for disputes
regarding those benefits. 9 Lastly, the legislature allows an employee
to bring suit outside of the WCAB only against any person other than
the employer or its insurer.1 0 The only exception to this rule comes
from Unruh, which allows a private cause of action against any entity
(i.e., employer, insurer, or claims administrator) that commits tor-
tious acts independent of its role as a provider of workers' compensa-
tion benefits.1 The court concluded that the current system for the
resolution of disputes between an employee and employer was
designed to be more efficient than the regular judicial process.12
The court overruled Dill because the court of appeals incorrectly
focused on the status of the defendant (i.e., employer, insurer, or
claims administrator) instead of focusing on the nature of the defend-
ant's actions (i.e., delay or refusal to pay benefits or tortious conduct
independent of duty to pay benefits).13 Even though an independent
7. Marsh & McLennan, 49 Cal. 3d at 11, 774 P.2d at 767, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 738. For
further discussion regarding the exclusive remedy of the employee's under Workers'
Compensation and the exceptions to the exclusive remedy, see 81 AM. JUR. 2D Work-
men's Compensation §§ 50-51 (1976); 65 CAL. JuR. 3D Work Injury Compensation
§§ 22-28 (1981).
8. Marsh & McLennan, 49 Cal. 3d at 5, 774 P.2d at 763, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 734; see
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602.
9. Marsh & McLennan, 49 Cal. 3d at 5, 774 P.2d at 763, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 734; see
CAL. LAB. CODE § 5300.
10. Marsh & McLennan, 49 Cal. 3d at 6, 774 P.2d at 764, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 735; see
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3850(b), 3852.
11! Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815
(1972).
12. Marsh & McLennan, 49 Cal. 3d at 6, 774 P.2d at 763, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
"The exclusive remedy provisions of the system are designed to provide 'a quick, sim-
ple and readily accessible method of claiming and receiving compensation.'" Id. (quot-
ing Everfield v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 115 Cal. App. 3d 15, 20, 171 Cal. Rptr. 164, 166
(1981)); see also 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Workmen's Compensa-
tion § 1 (8th ed. 1973).
13. Marsh & McLennan, 49 Cal. 3d at 7-10, 774 P.2d at 765-67, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 736-
38. The court specifically noted:
[T]he [Workers' Compensation] Act covers all disputes over the payment of
compensation to injured employees, regardless of what type of entity refused
or delayed those payments .... Only when the entity commits tortious acts
claims administrator is literally not an employer or an insurer, it is
usually hired to be responsible for the worker compensation related
tasks.14 Thus, the refusal or delay in payments of benefits by the ad-
ministrator is deemed to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
WCAB.15
Unless the employee or dependent of the employee has been in-
jured in a way unrelated to the delay or refusal of a claims adminis-
trator or adjustor to pay benefits, the exclusive remedy is the
recovery of workers' compensation benefits and not a private cause of
action under Unruh. Additionally, in the absence of an Unruh cause
of action, the exclusive jurisdiction of the action is with the WCAB.
JOHN M. BOWERS
independent of its role as a provider of workers' compensation benefits may
an employee maintain a private cause of action under Unruh.
Id. at 10, 774 P.2d at 767, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 738 (citations omitted); see also Phillips v.
Crawford, 202 Cal. App. 3d 383, 387-88, 248 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373-74 (1988) (Workers'
Compensation Act covers all disputes over the payment of compensation benefits re-
gardless of what entity delayed or refused payments); Mottola v. R.L. Kautz & Co., 199
Cal. App. 3d 98, 109, 244 Cal. Rptr. 737, 743 (1988) (court sustained claims adjuster's
demurrer based on exclusive remedy provision of Workers' Compensation Act); Santi-
ago v. Employee Benefits Services, 168 Cal. App. 3d 898, 904, 214 Cal. Rptr. 679, 683
(1985) (failure to pay workers' compensation benefits is within exclusive jurisdiction of
WCAB and not actionable under Unruh); Denning v. Esis, 139 Cal. App. 3d 946, 948,
189 Cal. Rptr. 118, 119 (1983) (jurisdiction of claim for failure to provide workers' com-
pensation benefits against independent claims administrator is with WCAB); Fremont
Indemnity v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. App. 3d 879, 882, 184 Cal. Rptr. 184, 186 (1982)
(actions in superior court for bad faith, emotional distress, and violation of Insurance
Code disallowed because they were based on delayed and altered compensation bene-
fits); Everfield, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 19, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 166 (reasons for delay, inten-
tional or negligent, excusable or not, can be questioned by the board and discipline
may be imposed).
14. Marsh & McLennan, 49 Cal. 3d at 8, 774 P.2d at 766, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
15. Id. at 10, 774 P.2d at 767, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 738. The dissent argued that the
causes of action should be allowed because the claims administrator was an independ-
ent contractor and thus an entity other than an employer or insurer. Id. at 11, 774 P.2d
at 768, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 739 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
